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Abstract
This paper studies the causes and consequences of political centralization
and fragmentation in China and Europe. We argue that the severe and unidirec-
tional threat of external invasion fostered political centralization in China while
Europe faced a wider variety of smaller external threats and remained politically
fragmented. We test our hypothesis using data on the frequency of nomadic
attacks and the number of regimes in China. Our model allows us to explore the
economic consequences of political centralization and fragmentation. Political
centralization in China led to lower taxation and hence faster population growth
during peacetime than in Europe. But it also meant that China was relatively
fragile in the event of an external invasion. Our results are consistent with
historical evidence of warfare, capital city location, tax levels, and population
growth in both China and Europe.
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1 Introduction
Since Montesquieu, scholars have attributed Europe’s success to its political fragmentation
(Montesquieu, 1989; Jones, 2003; Mokyr, 1990; Diamond, 1997). Nevertheless, throughout most
of history, the most economically developed region of the world was China, which was often a
unified empire. This contrast poses a puzzle that has important implications for our understanding
of the origins of modern economic growth: Why was Europe perennially fragmented after the
collapse of Rome, whereas political centralization was an equilibrium for most of Chinese history?
Can this fundamental difference in political institutions account for important disparities in
Chinese and European growth patterns?
This paper proposes a unified framework to (a) provide an explanation for the different
political equilibria in China and Europe; (b) explore the economic consequences of political
centralization and fragmentation. Our model predicts when and where empires are viable based
on the nature and intensity of the external threats that they face. It also highlights the different
implications that political centralization and fragmentation would have on the locations of capital
cities, levels of taxation, and population growth.
Our model focuses on the role of geography in determining China’s recurring unification and
Europe’s enduring fragmentation. Historically, China faced a severe, unidirectional threat from
the Eurasian steppe.1 Europe confronted several smaller threats from Scandinavia, Central Asia,
the Middle East, and North Africa. We show that if multitasking is inefficient, empires will not
be viable in Europe and political fragmentation will be the norm. On the other hand, empires
were more likely to emerge and survive in China because the nomadic threat threatened the
survival of small states more than larger ones. The different equilibria have important economic
consequences: political centralization allowed China to avoid wasteful interstate competition and
thereby enjoy faster economic and population growth during peacetime. However, the presence
of multiple states to protect different parts of the continent meant that Europe was relatively
more robust to both known threats and unexpected negative shocks.
To test the mechanisms identified in our model, we use time series analysis to show that
an increase in the frequency of nomadic attacks on China is associated with a decrease in the
number of regimes in historical China. Our estimates suggest that each additional nomadic
1We use ‘China’ and ‘China proper’ interchangeably throughout the paper. China proper refers to the middle
and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the river basins of the Yangzi, Huai, and Xi rivers and their tributaries,
or approximately the landmass between the Mongolian Steppe and the South China Sea (See Figure 14a). The
bulk of this landmass is less than 750 meters above sea level. Fertile alluvial soil and rich water resources promoted
early development of agriculture in this area. We equate Europe with Europe west of the Hajnal line that runs
from Trieste to St. Petersburg. Consistent with our theory, Eastern Europe, which historically faced significant
threats from the steppe, did see the rise of larger empires.
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attack per decade increased the probability of political unification in China by about 6.0% in the
long run. We go on to use the model to explain several notable features of Chinese and European
history such as the location choice of imperial capitals, army size, and different levels of taxation
at either end of Eurasia. Finally we provide evidence suggesting that political centralization
led to greater volatility of Chinese population growth and discuss the likely implications of this
prediction for economic growth.
This paper is related to a range of literatures. Our theoretical framework builds on the
research on the size of nations originated by Friedman (1977) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997,
2003). In particular, our emphasis on the importance of external threats is related to the insights
of Alesina and Spolaore (2005) who study the role of war in shaping political boundaries. In
examining the causes of political fragmentation and centralization in China and Europe, we
build on earlier work that points to the role of geography such as Diamond (1997) and on many
historians who stress how the threat of nomadic invasion from the steppe shaped Chinese history
(Lattimore, 1940; Grousset, 1970; Huang, 1988; Barfield, 1989; Gat, 2006).
Numerous economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists have argued that
political fragmentation in Europe had important consequences, including leading to the growth of
economic and political freedom (Montesquieu, 1989); helping preserve the existence of independent
city states and permitting the rise of a merchant class (Pirenne, 1925; Hicks, 1969; Jones, 2003;
Hall, 1985; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986); encouraging experiments in political structures
and investments in state capacity (Baechler, 1975; Cowen, 1990; Tilly, 1990; Hoffman, 2012;
Gennaioli and Voth, 2013);2 intensifying warfare and therefore increasing urbanization and
incomes (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013b);3 and fostering innovation and scientific development
(Diamond, 1997; Mokyr, 2007; Lagerlof, 2014).4 By developing a new explanation of why Europe
2Baechler observed that ‘political anarchy’ in Europe gave rise to experimentation in different state forms
(Baechler, 1975, 74). Cowen (1990) argues that interstate competition in Europe provided an incentive for early
modern states to develop capital markets and pro-market policies. Tilly (1990) studies the role capital-intensive
city states played in shaping the emergence of nation states in Europe. Hoffman (2012) uses a tournament model
to explain how interstate competition led to military innovation in the early modern Europe. Gennaioli and Voth
(2013) show the military revolution induced investments in state capacity in some, but not all, European states.
3Voigtländer and Voth (2013b) argue that political fragmentation interacted with the Black Death so as to
shift Europe into a higher income state-steady Malthusian equilibrium.
4Diamond argues that ‘Europe’s geographic balkanization resulted in dozens or hundreds of independent,
competing statelets and centers of innovation’ whereas in China ‘a decision by one despot could and repeatedly
did halt innovation’ (Diamond, 1997, 414–415). Mokyr notes that ‘many of the most influential and innovative
intellectuals took advantage of . . . the competitive ‘states system’. In different ways, Paracelsus, Comenius,
Descartes, Hobbes, and Bayle, to name but a few, survived through strategic moves across national boundaries.
They were able to flee persecutors, and while this imposed no-doubt considerable hardship, they survived and
prospered’ (Mokyr, 2007, 24). Lagerlof (2014) develops a growth model that emphasizes the benefits to scale
in innovation under political unification and a greater incentive to innovate under political fragmentation. He
calibrates the model to the initial conditions of China and Europe and shows that there are parameter values in
which political fragmentation can give rise to the emergence of sustained growth in Europe.
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was persistently fragmented, we complement this literature and recent research that emphasizes
other aspects of Europe’s possible advantages in the Great Divergence such as the higher age of
first marriage than the rest of the world (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013a); public provision of poor
relief verses reliance on clans as was the case in China (Greif et al., 2012); institutions that were
less reliant on religion (Rubin, 2011); greater human capital (Kelly et al., 2013), or higher social
status for entrepreneurs and inventors (McCloskey, 2010). Finally, our analysis is related to the
rise of state capacity in Europe (Dincecco, 2009; Dincecco and Katz, 2014; Johnson and Koyama,
2013, 2014a,b).
Our study of the consequences of political centralization and fragmentation is related to
Rosenthal and Wong (2011) who examine the costs and benefits of political centralization and
fragmentation in China and Europe. They argue that political fragmentation led to more
frequent warfare in medieval and early modern Europe, which imposed high costs but also set in
motion processes that would give Europe an advantage in producing an industrial revolution; in
particular, it lent an urban bias to the development of manufacturing which led to more capital
intensive forms of production.
Like Rosenthal and Wong, we emphasize that political fragmentation was costly, but we
depart from their view that the advantages of political fragmentation only accrued after 1750
(Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, 33).5 We develop a different argument based on the observation
that the costs of political collapse and external invasion were particularly high in China. That is,
we argue that the Chinese empire could indeed have been more conducive to Smithian economic
growth during stable periods as Rosenthal and Wong claim, but note that it was also less robust
to external shocks. Our model shows that population reversals are more likely in empires,
but between negative shocks, population in an empire may expand faster than in a system of
competing states. We argue that this greater volatility of economic development, output, and
population was the major barrier to sustained economic growth in China before 1800.
The framework that we introduce has important implications for our understanding of the
origins of economic growth. Since more people means more ideas, growth theory often contains a
scale-effect that implies that larger economies should be the first to experience modern economic
growth (Kremer, 1993; Jones, 2001). However, as Aiyar et al. (2008) point out, as long as
technological knowledge is embodied primarily in humans (instead of, for example, stored in
computers)—as was the case in the premodern world—the effect of population change on the
stock of knowledge is asymmetric: technological knowledge grows slowly with population growth,
but regresses swiftly when the population contracts. Pairing this insight with our theory suggests
5Their argument neglects evidence that Chinese per capita income was higher in 1100 than in 1700 (Broadberry,
2013). Furthermore, it is tied to a specific argument that sees the Industrial Revolution as the product of a
specific ratio of factor prices (Allen, 2009).
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that because China was more centralized and more vulnerable to negative population shocks,
it experienced more frequent interruptions in cumulative innovation. In other words, the start-
stop nature of China’s growth diminished its chances of escaping the Malthusian trap, while
the European economy was able to expand gradually to the point where the transition from
stagnation to growth was triggered (as in theories of unified growth, for instance, Galor and
Weil 2000; Galor 2011). In this respect, we offer a new interpretation that reconciles a big puzzle
in the history of economic growth: why China, the most populous economy in the world for
much of recorded history, was capable of coming ‘within a hair’s breadth of industrializing in the
fourteenth century’ (Jones, 2003, 160), but swiftly and permanently lost its technological lead
after the prolonged and devastating wars of the Mongol conquests.
Finally, our model also sheds light on the optimal location of capital cities. Economic theory
generally predicts that capital cities should be centrally located to maximize tax revenue or
improve governance (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Campante et al. 2014). This is confirmed
by empirical studies showing that isolated national or subnational capital cities are associated
with greater corruption (Olsson and Hansson, 2011; Campante and Do, 2014). We show that
that if the effectiveness of public goods provision (military defense in our example) differs with
the location of provision, it may be optimal to establish the political center of the empire away
from its economic or population center. This helps explain why the Romans moved their their
capital city from Rome to Constantinople in AD 330, and why Beijing, a city on the northern
periphery of China proper, was China’s political center for more than six centuries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides historical evidence that
characterizes (i) the extent to which China was politically unified and Europe fragmented
throughout their respective histories, and (ii) the degree to which both China and Europe were
threatened by external invasions. In Section 3 we introduce a model of political centralization
and decentralization. Section 4 provide empirical evidence to support our hypothesis that a
severe threat from the Eurasian steppe discouraged political fragmentation in China. In Section
5, we show that our model provides a coherent framework that can help to make sense of the
choice of capital cities, differential levels of taxation, and population growth patterns in historical
China and Europe. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Puzzle: Unified China and Divided Europe
Why was China politically unified for much of its history whereas Europe has been politically
fragmented since the end of the Roman Empire? Chinese historical records indicate that less
than 80 states ruled over parts or all of China between AD 0 and 1800 (Wilkinson, 2012). Nussli
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Figure 1: The number of sovereign states in China and Europe, 1-1800. Sources: Nussli
(2011); Wei (2011).
(2011) provides data on the sovereign states in existence at hundred year intervals in Europe.
Figure 1 plots the number of sovereign states in China and in Europe for the preindustrial period.
There have always been more states in Europe than in China throughout the past two millennia;
in fact since the Middle Ages there have been an order of magnitude more states in Europe than
in China.6
China’s first unification preceded Rome’s dominance of the Mediterranean. The Chinese
built a unitary state as early as the third century BC (Elvin, 1973; Needham, 1995; Fukuyama,
2011). Moreover, the Chinese empire outlasted Rome. Although individual dynasties rose and
fell, China as an empire survived until 1912. Between AD 1 and 1800, the landmass between the
Mongolian steppe and the South China Sea was ruled by one single authority for 1007 years (Ko
and Sng, 2013). Every period of political unity was followed by reunification—in China, Humpty
Dumpty could always be put back together again. This phenomenon is captured in the famous
opening lines of the classic Chinese novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms : ‘The empire, long
divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been.’
In comparison, Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire was characterized by persistent
political fragmentation—no subsequent empire was able to unify a large part of the continent
for more than a few decades. The number of states in Europe increased from 37 in 600 AD
to 61 in 900 and by 1300 there were 114 independent political entities. The level of political
fragmentation in Europe remained high during the early modern period.
6The Nussli (2011) data does not capture all political entities in Europe since that number is unknown—there
may have been as many as 1000 sovereign states within the Holy Roman Empire alone—but it does record the
majority of large and small political entities (Abramson, 2013). By contrast, the Chinese dynastic tables are
well known and the potential for disagreement is immaterial for our purposes. We count only sovereign states.
Including vassal states would further strengthen the argument.
6
Unified China; Divided Europe Ko, Koyama, and Sng
Through the years, scholars have offered various theories to explain China’s tendency toward
unification and Europe’s persistent fragmentation, ranging from culture and language (e.g.,
logographic versus phonogramatic writing systems) to topography (e.g., the presence or absence
of internal mountain barriers. See Diamond 1997, 322–333, for a detailed discussion). In this
paper, we put forth a different geographical explanation.7 We argue that in order to understand
why China has typically been unified whereas Europe has been fragmented, we need to assess
the threats and challenges that they faced given their geography. Europe was threatened by
Goths, Sarmatians, Vandals, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Arabs, Berbers, Magyars, Vikings, Pechnegs,
Cumans, Mongols, and Turks. Similarly, settled populations in China contended with a range of
steppe nomads and semi-nomadic people: Xiongnu, Juanjuan, Uygurs, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols,
and Manchus (Grousset, 1970; Barfield, 1989; Chaliand, 2005). But, for largely geographical
reasons, China’s external threats were more severe.8
The history of violent conflicts between the Chinese and the nomads has been extensively
documented and discussed in the literature (for example, see Barfield 1989; Di Cosmo 2002a).
As Lattimore (1940) pointed out seven decades ago, the geography of Eurasia created a natural
divide between the river basins of China and the Mongolian Steppe. In the Chinese river
basins, fertile alluvial soil, sufficient rainfall, and moderate temperature encouraged the early
development of intensive agriculture. In the steppe, pastoralism emerged as an adaptation to
the arid environment. Given the ecological fragility of the steppe, where droughts often led to
extensive and catastrophic deaths among animal herds, there was a tendency for the steppe
nomads to invade their settled neighbors for food during periods of cold temperature. This set
the stage for recurring military engagements between the steppe inhabitants and the Chinese in
history (Bai and Kung, 2011).9
While Eastern Europe, too, was vulnerable to incursions from the Eurasian steppe, Western
Europe was relatively protected from nomadic invasions due to its forests and mountain ranges,
and because the semi-pastoral lands of Hungary and Ukraine provided a buffer against nomadic
7We do not claim that only geography mattered. In fact, different factors—geography, culture, and others—
likely reinforced each other. For example, as Di Cosmo (2002a) points out, the recurring conflicts between the
steppe inhabitants and the agrarian Chinese helped forge a common cultural identity among the early competing
states in ancient China. In the conclusion, we also discuss how our framework complements Charles Tilly’s
argument that independent city states along the corridor between southern England and northern Italy prevented
the emergence of large empires in Europe (Tilly, 1990).
8See Appendix A.1 for a list of all major nomadic invasions of both China and Europe.
9Lieberman (2009) distinguishes between China, which lies in the exposed zones of inner Asia, and the
protected rimland of Europe and Southeast Asia. He notes that ‘For centuries nonpareil equestrian skills, an
ethos focused on hunting and warfare, proficiency with the short double-reflex bow (which allowed volleys from
horseback), tactical flexibility, a ruthlessness and stamina demanded by an unforgiving environment, remarkable
mobility, and a far larger percentage of men trained for war than in settled societies’ meant that settled society
faced a perennial threat from the horsemen of the steppe.
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Figure 2: The Eurasian Steppe and Major Cities in China and Europe. Each shade
represents 600 kilometers from the steppe.
invasion (Gat, 2006, 383). The Hunnic invasions of the fifth century, the Magyar invasions of
the ninth century, and the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century pose partial exceptions
to this. Nevertheless, it is well established that the military superiority of all of these invaders
declined dramatically once they entered Europe due to the absence of the vast tracts of grassland
required to maintain the high ratio of horses to men that nomadic armies typically relied upon
for their effectiveness (Di Cosmo, 2002b). By contrast, China’s more compact geography and a
sharper transition from the steppe to heavily settled lands meant that steppe invasions posed a
more extensive threat to its populated agricultural communities and urban centers. Figure 2
illustrates the distance of cities in China and Europe from the Eurasian steppe. As it makes
clear, Guangzhou, the southernmost major Chinese city, was almost as close to the steppe as
Vienna, the easternmost major western European city.
Although the sedentary Chinese were more populous by far, before the advent of effective
gunpowder weapons the steppe nomads often held the upper hand in military engagements as
their expertise in horses allowed them to develop powerful and mobile cavalry units (Barfield,
1989; Gat, 2006). And when the odds were not in the nomads’ favor, the Eurasian steppe
provided a safe haven for them to retreat into. Since they could reach the Black Sea from
Mongolia in a matter of weeks through the undifferentiated ‘highway of grass’ (Frachetti, 2008,
7), they effectively enjoyed an ‘indefinite margin of retreat’—no matter how badly they were
defeated in battle, they could never be conquered in war (Lattimore, 1940). Until Russia’s
expansion into Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries denied the nomads this
traditional escape route, the steppe threat was a recurring problem that the Chinese could not
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permanently resolve (Perdue, 2005). Their best hope for security was the successful containment
of the nomadic threat at the frontier—hence the construction of the first Great Wall immediately
after the first unification of China under the Qin dynasty in 221 BC.10 The project was repeated
time and again by successive dynasties at great cost to keep the ‘barbarians’ at bay.
It is therefore of no surprise that the threat of steppe nomads played a decisive role in Chinese
history and the evolution of its political economy. Of the ten dynasties that ruled a unified or
mostly unified China, three fell to nomadic invaders (Jin, Song, and Ming) and two were set
up by nomadic conquerors (Yuan and Qing). The fall of two others (Qin and Sui) could be
traced to the overzealous attitude of their rulers toward securing China’s northern border, which
placed an unbearable strain on the peasants and led to widespread revolts. The remaining three,
the Former Han, Later Han, and Tang, built their respective golden ages upon the temporary
subjugation of the steppe.
Many scholars have recognized the importance of the steppe nomads to state formation in
ancient China (Lattimore, 1940; Huang, 1988; Lieberman, 2009; Turchin, 2009; Ma, 2012; Deng,
2012). We build on this literature by highlighting another important element in the nature of
this threat that has been overlooked so far: while—as the literature has pointed out—the severity
of the nomadic problem provided the centripetal force that pushed the Chinese regions toward
political centralization, it was also crucial that the external threats confronting China happened
to be unidirectional and there were no major threats from other fronts that would have increased
the appeal of a more flexible politically decentralized system.
Before 1800, all major invasions of China came from the north. We argue that this was
geographically determined: as Figure 3 illustrates, China was shielded from the south and the
west by the Himalayas, the Tibetan plateau, and the tropical rain forests of Indochina.11 By
contrast, Europe was less isolated from other parts of Eurasia and consequently prospective
European empires typically faced enemies on multiple fronts: Vikings from the north, Muslims
from the south, Magyars, Mongols, and Ottomans and others from the east (Appendix A.2).12
10During the Warring States period (475–221 BC) when China was divided into about a dozen competing
kingdoms, the three that bordered the steppe—Qin, Zhao, and Yan—built long walls that were later linked up by
Qin to form the first Great Wall of China after its successful unification of China.
11Lewis (1991, 4–5) notes that the ‘high desiccated plateaus and deserts . . . dominated the terrain of Mongolia
and Turkestan . . . formed barriers between it and the Indic and Islamic worlds to the west and south. While it
was possible to reach Burma over difficult mountain passes leading there from the upper Yangtze valley, the most
practicable routes to the west were by way of Kansu, Inner Mongolia, and eastern Turkestan and then on to
Khorasan and southern Russia.’
12To be precise, what matters for our theory is the existence of a potential threat. Thus Europe continued
to face a potential threat of invasion from North Africa due to geographical proximity throughout this period,
despite the fact that the majority of actual invasions from North Africa occurred before 1300. Portugal and Spain
faced a threat from North Africa through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but they typically dealt with it
through offensive action (i.e., Charles’s V conquest of Tunis 1535—a response to raids by Barbarossa along the
southern Italian coast—and Sebastian I’s invasion of Morocco which ended in his defeat at the Battle of Alcácer
9
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Figure 3: Although China was exposed to steppe invasion from its north, huge mountain
ranges to its west, thick forests to its south, and the vast Pacific Ocean to its east meant
that it was otherwise relatively isolated. By contrast, Europe was connected to the rest of
Eurasia and Africa in multiple directions.
Figure 4a, which is derived from Peter Brecke’s Conflict Catalog Dataset (Brecke, 1999),
shows that while warfare was much more common in Europe between 1400 and 1800, a majority
of China’s military conflicts between 1400 and 1800 were with nomads.
Meanwhile, according to Figure 4b, external invasions and major wars had a bigger impact
in China than in Europe. In fact, it is clear that the most violent wars of the preindustrial
period occurred in Asia and particularly in China.13 Only two wars with estimated death tolls
in excess of 5 million are recorded for Europe compared with five for China.14 Wars in China
such as the An Lushan Rebellion, the Mongol invasions, and the Ming-Manchu transition were
extremely costly conflicts, because they involved the collapses or near collapses of entire empires.
Warfare in Europe was endemic, but rarely resulted in large scale socio-economic collapse. The
only European war that matched the death tolls of the worst conflicts in Chinese history was the
Thirty Years War, which was a German civil war into which the other European powers were
drawn. In the next section, we show how political centralization in China and fragmentation in
Europe could help explain these patterns.
Quibir in 1578).
13All data on deaths from warfare in the preindustrial period are highly speculative, but for our purposes what
is important is the order of magnitude rather than the precise numbers reported.
14The majority of deaths in preindustrial wars did not occur in the battlefield but were the result of disease
and pressure on food supplies (see Voigtländer and Voth 2013b, 781 for a discussion).
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(a) Number of Violent Conflicts (Brecke, 1999) (b) Largest Wars By No. of Deaths (White, 2013)
Figure 4: The Nature, Frequency, and Intensity of Warfare in China and Europe
3 Model
Building on the preceding discussion, we develop a model to explore the consequences of the
severe one-sided threat that China faced in contrast to the weaker multi-sided threat faced by
states in Europe. To keep our analysis tractable, we consider a continent, which may represent
China or Europe, as a Hoteling’s linear city of unit length.15 The continent faces external threats
that can be one or two-sided. In particular, the two-sided threat in this one-dimensional model
is analogous to a multi-sided threat in the multi-dimensional real world.
One or more regimes may exist in the continent. Each regime (a) chooses its capital city
(represented by a point along the linear line), (b) taxes its population, and (c) builds the military
to resist the external threat and to compete with other states for territory and population. For
a regime to remain viable, two conditions have to be met: (i) the regime has to offer military
protection to at least 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 fraction of its subjects; (ii) its net tax revenue has to be non-
negative. If a regime that rules an entire continent is not viable, political centralization will not
be stable in this continent. If a continent cannot support more than one viable regime, political
fragmentation will be unstable. Our central concern is the stability of political centralization or
fragmentation in a continent given the nature of external threats that it confronts.
15We refer to both Europe and China as ‘continents’ for convenience.
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3.1 Setup
We model a continent as a line [0, 1] with a unit mass of individuals uniformly distributed along
this line. An individual at x ∈ [0, 1] is endowed with income y + y where y is taxable. For now,
we fix the level of taxation at y; we will endogenize it later.
The continent is divided into s ∈ {1, 2, 3...} connected, mutually exclusive intervals each ruled
by a separate political authority or regime. We take s as given and do not model how regimes
arise. Historically, the emergence of a regime is often fraught with stochastic elements—the birth
of a military genius; policy errors made by the incumbent ruler; climatic change; and so on—that
are difficult to capture in a model. Instead, we are concerned with the viability of each regime in
a continent of s regimes: we ask, for any given s, is this political configuration stable and likely
to persist given the continent’s external environment?
Of interest is the comparison between s = 1, which corresponds to political centraliza-
tion or empire, and s ≥ 2, which we will refer to as interstate competition or political
fragmentation. Because of our choice of a linear city model, external threats could threaten a
continent from at most two fronts, for clarity of exposition we focus on the corresponding case of
s = 2 to represent s ≥ 2. All subsequent results are qualitatively similar if we replace s = 2 with
s > 2 as the standard with which to compare against s = 1. Furthermore, for convenience and
because we are primarily interested in analyzing two comparable regimes, we will treat l and r
as identical and focus on the symmetric equilibrium when deriving the results.16
The continent faces threats from outside. We model these external threats as emanating
either from both frontiers of the continent (at x = 0 and x = 1) or just from one frontier of
the continent (at x = 0 only without loss of generality). Whether the threat is one-sided or
two-sided depends on the continent’s geographical environment which is exogenously determined.
An external threat, if realized, causes gross damage λ(Λ, 0) > 0 at the frontier(s) of the continent
(Figures 5 and 6). The damage can spread further into the continent: if a point is t distance
away from the frontier, the gross damage is λ(Λ, t) where λ1 > 0, and λ2 < 0. The negative
derivative of λ with respect to t implies that the threat decreases in strength as it moves inland.
A regime may invest in the military to mitigate the damage caused by the external threat.
The cost of military investment is convex. For a given cost parameter θ, for regime i ∈ {e, l, r} to
provide a military investment of Mi ≥ 0, it costs c(Mi, θ), which is a continuously differentiable
function and c(0, θ) = 0, c1 > 0, c11 > 0, c2 > 0, and c12 > 0. An example of a functional form
that satisfies these conditions is c(Mi, θ) = θM2i .
Like the external threat, the strength of the military is not constant across space; the military
16In particular, if one of the two regimes rules a much larger interval than the other one, it may be more
appropriate to use ‘empire’ instead of ‘interstate competition’ to describe the political reality of the continent.
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t
λ(Λ′, t)
Figure 5: A severe, one-sided threat.
0 1
t tλ(Λ, t) λ(Λ, t)
Figure 6: A smaller, two-sided threat.
is strongest at its center of deployment, but deteriorates over distance. Let Gi denote regime i’s
center of military deployment—referred to here as i’s capital city.17 For notational convenience,
Ge and Gl are measured from 0 while Gr is measured from 1. As illustrated in Figure 7, for a
location that is t distance away from Gi, regime i’s military strength on that location is given
by m(Mi, t), where m1 > 0, and m2 < 0.
We assume that the strength of the military deteriorates over distance (i.e., m2 < 0) for two
reasons: logistics and agency costs. It is well recognized that historically, the projection of military
power was constrained by logistics (van Creveld, 2004). The Roman historian Keith Hopkins
highlights the challenges that premodern transportation technologies imposed on political and
military control by describing the Roman Empire as ‘several months wide—and larger in winter
than in summer’ (Morris and Scheidel, 2009, 186). Shen Kuo (1031–1095), a polymath and ‘one
of the greatest scientific minds in Chinese history’ (Needham, 1969, 27), estimated that in his
time a soldier would need one porter for supplies to march 18 days, while three porters would
be required for a 31-day campaign as the existing porter now needed someone else to carry his
supplies (Shen, 2011).
In addition, military effectiveness may also deteriorate over distance due to the cost of
controlling armies from afar or, specifically, from agency problems. If the ruler assumes direct
control of the military as the commander-in-chief, his ability to react swiftly to events on the
ground is constrained by slowness of communications. Alternatively, the ruler may delegate
some of his troops to military generals stationed outside the capital city, but—as a safeguard
against potentially disloyal commanders—keep the elite forces under close control. This will also
generate the pattern of falling military effectiveness over distance.18
The military can block the external threat from spreading inland. Specifically, consider a
one-sided threat initiated at x = 0, if the military strength of regime i ∈ {e, l} at x is no less
17As a matter of interest, the capital was known as jing-shi in Chinese, or literally the peak (jing) and the
military (shi).
18Historically, we observe that the rulers of China and Rome were increasingly unwilling to delegate large
armies to their subordinates and preferred to keep their armies under close control by stationing themselves near
the frontiers. See Section 5.1 for more discussion.
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0 1Gi
Mi
t
m(Mi, t)
Figure 7: Regime i decides the
location of its capital city (Gi) and
its military investment (Mi).
0 1Gl
Ml
Gr
Mr
b
Figure 8: The border (b) between
two regimes is determined by the
locations of their capital cities (Gl
and Gr) and their relative military
investments (Ml and Mr).
than the gross damage of the external threat at that location, then x and any location to its
right is said to be protected, that is, individuals at these locations suffers zero damage from
the threat. Formally, a location x is protected by regime i if there exists 0 ≤ x′ ≤ x such that
m(Mi, |Gi − x′|)− λ(Λ, x′) ≥ 0. Let Di denote the set of locations that is protected by regime
i, or Di ≡ {x ∈ [0, 1] : x is protected by regime i}. If x is not protected by regime i, or x /∈ Di,
then κi, the net damage at x, is the gross damage caused by the threat minus the strength of
regime i at x, i.e., κi(x) ≡ λ(Λ, x)−m(Mi, |Gi − x|). For threats initiated at x = 1, we define
protection, the set Di, and the net damage κi in a similar fashion.
We assume that if a regime fails to provide protection to δ fraction of its population, then a
revolution occurs and the regime receives a negative payoff. This assumption, common in models
of political economy, captures the idea that a regime that disregards the welfare of its subjects
will be overthrown by a revolution, but revolutions involve overcoming collective-action problems
and therefore require support from a threshold population of 1 − δ to be successful (Tullock,
1971; Alesina and Spolaore, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). It is also consistent with the
Confucian belief that the legitimacy of a government is contingent upon its ability to protect
the people from harm and tax reasonably so that the people can maintain a constant means of
livelihood. A government that loses this ability loses its legitimacy, or its ‘mandate from heaven’,
and the people would therefore be entitled to depose it (Mencius, 2004).
Besides resisting external threats, in the absence of political centralization investing in the
military also helps competing regimes determine their borders. When s = 2 and the continent’s
taxable output y is shared between two regimes, l and r. Let b represent the border of the
two regimes. Without loss of generality, we restrict the locations of capitals to Gl + Gr ≤ 1,
that is, regime l is always to the left of regime r. The border b is determined by the condition
m(Ml, b − Gl) = m(Mr, (1− b) − Gr). In other words, b is the location where the military
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strengths of both regimes are equal, as illustrated in Figure 8.19 The net revenues for regimes
l and r are Vl = by − c(Ml) and Vr = (1− b) y − c(Mr). By comparison, when an empire (e)
controls the whole continent, its net tax revenue is Ve = y − c(Me).
3.2 Equilibrium
Consider the optimization problem facing a single regime or empire (e). Regime e first decides
the location of capital Ge ∈ [0, 1] and then decides military investment Me ≥ 0 to maximize the
net revenue Ve = y − c(Me). Since this is a two-stage decision process, we employ backward
induction to solve the model.20
Consider x∗(Λ) ∈ [0, 1] such that λ(Λ, x∗(Λ)) = 0. In other words, x∗(Λ) is the leftmost
location where the gross damage caused by the threat emanating from the left is zero. If such
x∗(Λ) does not exist, let x∗(Λ) ≡ 1. Consider ΛI and Λ¯I such that x∗ (ΛI) = 1 − δ/2 and
x∗
(
Λ¯I
)
= 1− δ respectively. Let δˆ denote the fraction of the continent that is protected from
the external threat in equilibrium (i.e. δˆ = |De| when s = 1 and δˆ = |Dl|+ |Dr| when s = 2).
Proposition 1 (Empire). When the threat is two-sided:
1. If Λ ≤ ΛI , the regime locates the capital city at Ge ∈ [0, 1], makes zero military investment,
and δˆ ≥ δ;
2. There exists ΛII > ΛI such that if Λ > ΛII , the regime locates the capital city at the center
of the continent, spends a non-zero amount on the military to confront the threat emanating
from both frontiers, and δˆ = δ;
3. If ΛI < Λ ≤ ΛII , the regime locates the capital city closer to one frontier than the other,
invests a non-zero amount on the military to confront the threat emanating from the frontier
that its capital city is closer to, and δˆ = δ;
When the threat is one-sided:
4. If Λ ≤ Λ¯I , the regime locates the capital city at Ge ∈ [0, 1], makes zero military investment,
and δˆ ≥ δ;
5. If Λ > Λ¯I , the regime locates the capital city at G∗e = 1− δ and spends a non-zero amount
on the military to confront the threat emanating from x = 0, and δˆ = δ.
19For a complete treatment of the determination of b in all cases, see Appendix A.3.
20Proofs of the propositions are provided in Appendix A.4–A.6.
15
Unified China; Divided Europe Ko, Koyama, and Sng
In Cases 1 and 4 above, the threat is weak enough for the empire to ignore it completely.
This is because the sole motivation for the empire to invest in the military is to keep δ fraction
of its population protected, so as to prevent a revolution. Hence, if the threat does not affect
more than 1− δ of the population, the regime merely ignores it. In all other cases, the threat
is meaningful and the empire builds a military to meet the threshold of protecting δ of the
population.
Now consider the two-stage game with interstate competition (s = 2). Regimes l and r first
simultaneously choose the location of their capital cities Gl ∈ [0, 1] and Gr ∈ [0, 1]. After knowing
the locations of each other, the two regimes simultaneously make military investments Ml ≥ 0
and Mr ≥ 0. This is a complete information game and we employ subgame-perfect equilibrium
as the solution concept.
Proposition 2 (Political Fragmentation). When the threat is two-sided:
1. There exists a threshold threat level ΛIII such that if Λ ≤ ΛIII , the revolution constraints
do not bind and δˆ ≥ δ. The equilibrium military investments and location of capitals are
the same as in the case when Λ = 0.
2. Otherwise, the revolution constraints bind and δˆ = δ.
With or without the external threat, regimes in a competitive state system have to invest in
the military to gain territories. Case 1 of Proposition 2 states that unless the external threat is
severe (i.e. Λ > ΛIII), regimes do not have to make additional military investments to protect
their populations as their existing military capacity—built up as a result of competition among
themselves—already meets this requirement.
3.3 Implications for Political Centralization or Fragmentation
We now derive the implications of this simple model. First, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that
political centralization and fragmentation have different strengths and weaknesses. Since an
empire invests in the military only to protect itself against external threats, while in a competitive
state system regimes will invest in the military even in the absence of external threats so as to
gain and maintain territorial control, interstate competition may lead to over-investment in the
military. From a static perspective, there are Pareto gains to be reaped if competitive regimes
coordinate among themselves to reduce their military spendings:
Corollary 1 (Wastefulness of interstate competition). In the absence of external threats,
military investment is zero under an empire but strictly positive under interstate competition.
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However if the external threat is meaningful in that it induces an empire to spend a non-zero
amount on the military to deal with it, then the empire will only provide protection to a fraction
δ of the population so as to satisfy the revolution constraint (Figure 9). By contrast, in a
competitive state system (s = 2), the competition-induced over-investment in the military may
result in a larger-than-δ fraction of the continent being defended from external threats (Figure
10). Hence:
Corollary 2 (Robustness of interstate competition). When external threats are meaningful,
interstate competition protects a weakly bigger interval of the continent than an empire does.
Proposition 1 also suggests that the choice of an empire’s capital city is influenced by the
nature of the external threats that it confronts. If the costs of tax collection do not vary with
distance, in the absence of external threats it does not matter where the empire’s capital city is
located. If such costs are linear or convex, it can be shown that the empire’s capital city should
always be at the center of the continent, i.e., G∗e = 0.5. However, if the empire faces a meaningful
one-sided threat (emanating from the left), it will locate its capital city at G∗e = 1− δ to contain
the threat. In this case, centrality of the capital city is no longer optimal unless δ = 0.5. The
higher is δ, the closer the capital city is to the frontier where the threat originates. Hence:
Corollary 3 (Locational choice of capital city). When the external threat is meaningful and
one-sided, it is not optimal for an empire to locate its capital city at the center of the continent,
i.e., G∗e 6= 0.5.
Theoretical and empirical studies generally argue that capital cities should be centrally
located to maximize tax revenue or improve governance (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Olsson and
Hansson 2011; Campante et al. 2014; Campante and Do 2014). Corollary 3 suggests that if the
state is expected by its subjects to provide public goods, as long as the effectiveness of public
goods provision (military defense in this case) differs with the location of provision, separating
the political center of the empire from its economic or population center could be optimal. This
is true whether or not the costs of tax collection vary with distance. In Section 5.1, we provide a
historical discussion in light of this prediction.
Next, we use this simple setup to show that whether or not a continent is politically centralized
or fragmented is shaped by the nature of the external threats that it faces.
As earlier discussed, we define a regime as viable if its equilibrium net revenue is non-negative.
When s = 1 and regime e is not viable, then political centralization or empire is not a stable
outcome, that is, even if an empire emerges, it is not sustainable in the long run. Likewise, when
s = 2 and if one of the two regimes is not viable, political fragmentation will be unstable. We
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Figure 9: The optimal military in-
vestment under political centraliza-
tion.
Figure 10: The optimal military in-
vestment under political decentraliza-
tion.
are concerned with the stability of political centralization or fragmentation given the nature of
the external threat that it confronts.
Trivially, if an external threat is small enough so that it will not lead to a revolution when
military investment is zero, then the threat has no impact on the viability of regimes. In this
case, whether the continent is politically centralized or fragmented would not matter. Both
outcomes are stable. In the remaining section, we focus on meaningful threats that cannot be
completely ignored.
Specifically, we compare the scenario of a meaningful one-sided threat (Λ > Λ¯I) with that
of a two-sided threat. For the two-sided threat, we focus on the range ΛI < Λ ≤ ΛIII , where
the threat is meaningful but not severe enough so that the military investments of regimes in
interstate competition are driven by the arms race among themselves and not by the external
threat. For easy reference, we call this a moderate threat. The two scenarios are analogous to
the Chinese and the European cases respectively.
Proposition 3 (Net revenue comparison). Under a one-sided threat, the net revenue of regime
e is always larger than the sum of net revenues of regimes l and r. Under a moderate two-sided
threat, the net revenue of regime e is decreasing in θ but the sum of net revenues for regimes l
and r are increasing in θ.
Under a one-sided threat, as the strength of the threat (Λ) increases, the net revenue of regime
e and the sum of net revenues of regimes l and r both decrease. According to Proposition 3,
there exists some threshold level Λ˙ such that when Λ = Λ˙, the sum of net revenues of regimes
l and r is zero while the net revenue of regime e is still strictly positive. Meanwhile, under a
moderate, two-sided threat, as the cost of military investment (θ) increases, the net revenue of e
will decrease rapidly relative to the sum of net revenues of l and r. Hence, Proposition 3 gives
rise to Corollaries 4 and 5 below:
Corollary 4 (Stability under one-sided, severe threat). When the external threat is one-
sided and severe, political centralization is more likely to be stable than political fragmentation.
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Corollary 5 (Stability under two-sided, moderate threat). When the external threat is
moderate and two-sided, political centralization is less likely to be stable than political fragmentation
if θ is high.
3.4 Taxation
Now let us endogenize taxation. Previously, the amount of taxes paid in the continent was always
equal to per capita income y. Suppose regime i has the option of reducing the tax burden of its
people by Ri ≥ 0. Lowering taxes eases the revolution constraint (as it helps keep the population
content) so that an individual at x does not engage in revolution if:
Ri︸︷︷︸
tax reimbursement
+m(Mi, |Gi − x|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
military protection
− λ(Λ, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
damage from threat
≥ 0.
When s = 1, as long as the threat level is meaningful enough for the empire to spend a non-zero
amount on the military, the revolution constraint will always bind in equilibrium regardless of
whether the threats are one-sided or two-sided. We show in Appendix A.7 that if θ is sufficiently
high, that is, if building a military is costly, the empire will opt to provide some tax reimbursement
instead of relying solely on building the military to satisfy the revolution constraint.
By contrast, when s = 2, the revolution constraint will not bind in equilibrium unless the
threat is severe. In this case, regimes l and r will set Rl = Rr = 0.
Consider the two scenarios that we are examining: if an empire emerges in the face of a
severe one-sided threat, the effective level of taxation will be y −Re, where Re ≥ 0; if interstate
competition prevails under a moderate two-sided threat, the level of taxation will remain at y.
More generally, we can state:
Corollary 6 (Taxation). Taxation is weakly lower under political centralization than under
political fragmentation.
3.5 Population Dynamics and Long-run Growth
Until now, we have assumed that external threats are always present. Consider a dynamic
model where in each period, the external threat is realized with some positive probability. Each
individual lives for one period and inelastically supplies labor to produce y + y, where y is not
taxable and y is taxed. For individual x under regime i, the disposable income is y¯ = y+Ri−κi(x)
where Ri is the tax reimbursed by regime i and κi(x) is the net damage caused by the stochastic
shock. Each individual chooses between private consumption c and producing n offspring to
maximize her utility u(c, n) subject to the budget constraint ρn + c ≤ y¯, where ρ represents
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Figure 11: Under political central-
ization, there is a positive level of tax
reduction, i.e. R∗e > 0 . Under politi-
cal decentralization, tax reduction is
zero.
Figure 12: Under political decentral-
ization, the fraction of the population
protected from invasion is at least δ.
Under political centralization, it is at
most δ.
the cost of raising a child. We assume that c and n are complements and u is increasing and
concave in both arguments. Standard optimization implies that the optimal number of children
is n = g(y¯) where g′ > 0.
For simplicity, we assume that individuals redistribute themselves uniformly over the continent
at the beginning of each period. Population growth is therefore given by:
N =
∫ 1
0
ndx =
∫ 1
0
g(y¯) dx .
Let NE and NF denote population growths in continent E and continent F respectively. The
two continents are identical except that continent E is ruled by an empire (s = 1) and faces a
severe one-sided threat of size ΛE, while continent F is politically fragmented (s = 2) and faces
a moderate two-sided threat of size ΛF .
When the external threat is not realized, the populations in the two continents grow to
NE = g(y +Re) and NF = g(y) respectively. Since NE > NF , population grows faster under the
empire.
However, the converse may be true if the external threat is realized. In this case, realized
population growth under empire and political fragmentation is given by, respectively:
NE =
∫ 1
0
g(y +Re − 1x/∈De [λ(ΛE, x)−m(Me, |Ge − x|)]) dx;
NF =
∫ 1
0
g(y − 1x<b,x/∈Dl [λ(ΛF , x)−m(Ml, |Gl − x|)]
− 1x>b,x/∈Dr [λ(ΛF , 1− x)−m(Mr, |Gr − (1− x)|)]) dx.
Now NE < NF if ΛE is sufficiently large with respect to ΛF .
For the purpose of illustration, let u(c, n) = c1−γnγ. It can be shown that when the shock is
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realized, the population growth under empire and under fragmentation are given by:
NE =
γ
ρ
·
{
(y +Re)−
∫
x/∈De
λ(ΛE, x)−m(Me, |Ge − x|) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Area〈E〉
}
;
NF =
γ
ρ
·
{
y − 2 ·
∫
x<b,x/∈Dl
λ(ΛF , x)−m(Ml, |Gl − x|) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Area〈F 〉
}
,
where Area 〈E〉 and Area 〈F 〉 are illustrated in Figures 11 and 12.
Given the nature of the threats and the political configurations in the two continents, Area 〈E〉
is likely to be larger than Area 〈F 〉 for two reasons: First, ΛE > ΛF ; Second, as we have shown
in Corollary 2, the empire offers protection to only δ fraction of continent E (and less than δ if
tax reduction is offered), while the fraction of continent F that is protected is always weakly
larger than δ due to the presence of interstate competition. If Area 〈F 〉 < Area 〈E〉 − RE, it
follows that NE < NF :
Corollary 7 (Population Change). If the external threat is not realized, population grows
faster under political centralization. If the external threat is realized, a population contraction is
more likely under political centralization than under political fragmentation.
Corollary 7 suggests that population growth is usually faster under an empire. However, in
the event of an exogenous shock, the fall in population may be less severe under political
fragmentation. In other words, population growth is likely to be more volatile under political
centralization relative to political fragmentation. See Appendix A.8 for a numerical example of
Corollary 7.
In interpreting our model, we have focused on external invasions. More generally, however,
negative shocks could also stem from unforeseen political collapses and peasant rebellions in
addition to invasions from outside. The central point we emphasize is that interstate competition
results in a greater proportion of territory being protected than is the case under political
centralization.
4 Threats and Regime Size: Empirical Evidence
The model predicts that the stability of political centralization and fragmentation is unaffected
by external threats when these threats are sufficiently small; an environment with moderate
external threats originating from multiple fronts favors interstate competition; a unidirectional
threat promotes political unification, especially if the threat is severe. To test these predictions,
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we first investigate the empirical relationship between the frequency of nomadic attacks and the
number of regimes in China proper. Subsequently, we examine historical evidence from Europe
for consistency with the predictions.
4.1 Empirical Evidence from China
Data Sources and Definition of Variables In a recent paper, Bai and Kung (2011) show
that nomadic incursions into China proper were correlated with exogenous variations in rainfall
as climatic disasters such as droughts often triggered subsistence crises that drove the inhabitants
of the ecologically fragile steppe to invade their settled neighbors for food. We make use of their
data set and empirical strategy to check if there was a relationship between the frequency of
nomadic attacks and the number of regimes in China proper. This helps to ensure that our
empirical evidence is robust and is not subjected to selective adoption to suit our purpose.
Bai and Kung’s data span 2,060 years (from 220 BC to AD 1839) and are drawn from
four sources: A Chronology of Warfare in Dynastic China (China’s Military History Editorial
Committee, 2003), A Compendium of Historical Materials on Natural Disasters in Chinese
Agriculture (Zhang et al., 1994), A Concise Narrative of Irrigation History of the Yellow River
(Editorial Committee of Irrigation History of the Yellow River, 1982), and the Handbook of the
Annals of China’s Dynasties (Gu, 1995). Of these sources, the first three have been widely used
in related research and are considered reliable sources while the fourth contains general historical
information that can be easily verified.21
As listed in Table 1, the decadal variables Bai and Kung constructed include: (i) the
frequency of nomadic attacks on China’s Central Plain (Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hebei); (ii) two
precipitation variables that measure the extent of severe droughts and floods in the Central Plain;
(iii) other climatic control variables (snow and other low temperature disasters, temperature);
(iv) historical dummy variables to control for the three periods in Chinese history when nomadic
regimes ruled the Central Plain; and (v) a time trend. Drawing from Wei (2011), we add two
variables required for this exercise: a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if China was
politically unified in a given decade and 1 otherwise (Fragmentation); and a logged variable that
counts the average number of regimes in China proper in a given decade (#Regime).
Baseline Estimation As a baseline to investigate the effects of nomadic invasions on political
fragmentation in China proper, we adopt a simple autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model:
21A detailed check of the accuracy of the data on Sino-nomadic conflicts is available in Bai and Kung (2011,
Table A.2.)
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Table 1: List of Variables and Summary Statistics
Variable Description mean s.d.
Fragmentation y1t =1 if more than 1 regime ruled China proper in decade t 0.41 0.49
#Regimes y2t Average number of regimes in China proper in decade t (log) 0.39 0.54
Nomadic attacks xt Frequency of attacks initiated by the nomads in decade t 2.53 3.50
Lower precipitation z1t Share of years with records of drought disasters on the Central Plain
in decade t 0.50 0.30
Higher precipitation z2t Share of years with records of Yellow River levee breaches in decade t 0.18 0.21
Snow disasters w1t Share of years with records of heavy snow on the Central Plain in decade t 0.12 0.14
Low temperature w2t Share of years with records of low-temperature calamities (e.g., frost) on 0.16 0.19
disasters the Central Plain in decade t
Temperature w3t Average temperature in decade t 9.46 0.89
Nomadic conquest 1 w4t =1 if the Central Plain was governed by the nomads (317–589) 0.13 0.33
Nomadic conquest 2 w5t =1 if the Central Plain was governed by the nomads (1126–1368) 0.12 0.32
Nomadic conquest 3 w6t =1 if the Central Plain was governed by the nomads (1644–1839) 0.10 0.29
Time trend w7t Decade: -22–183 (219 BC–1839) 80.5 59.6
Sources: Bai and Kung (2011) and Wei (2011).
yt = φ0 +
p∑
i=1
φiyt−i +
q∑
i=0
µixt−i + t , (1)
where the dependent variable yt is either the dummy variable Fragmentation or #Regime, the
logarithm of the number of regimes in China proper in decade t. The explanatory variable xt is
the number of nomadic incursions into China proper in decade t.
According to Corollary 4, an increase in the severity of nomadic threat favors political
centralization. While this effect may not be immediate—in the short run, a spike in nomadic
attacks could lead to the collapse of the central authority and the emergence of a host of succession
states to fill up the political vacuum—Corollary 4 suggests that increased nomadic attacks should
have a long run negative effect on the number of regimes in China proper. In other words, we
expect µ0 + µ1 + µ2 + ...+ µq < 0.
The ADL model is appropriate for our purpose because of its flexibility. Furthermore, it
generates unbiased long run estimates and valid t-statistics even in the presence of endogeneity
(Harris and Sollis, 2003). To validate our use of the ADL methodology, we use the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test to ensure that all variables are stationary. To determine the appropriate
number of lags, we follow the general-to-specific approach proposed by Ng and Perron (1995) to
seek the values of p and q in equation 1 that minimize the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).22
We find that the AIC is minimized when p = 3 and q = 1, regardless of whether the dependent
variable is Fragmentation or #Regime. In the baseline linear probability model reported in column
(a) of Table 2, where the dependent variable is Fragmentation, we find that the nomadic invasion
variable and its lagged value are both statistically significant, but they carry opposite signs: an
22When implementing the general-to-specific approach, we choose p = q = 10 as the cut-off and check every
combination of p ≤ 10 and q ≤ 10.
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Table 2: Baseline Estimation: ADL Model
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Dependent variable Fragmentation #Regimes #Regimes Fragmentation #Regimes #Regimes
Fragmentation: Lag 1 0.906*** 0.875***
(0.0651) (0.0668)
Fragmentation: Lag 2 -0.283*** -0.277***
(0.0843) (0.0837)
Fragmentation: Lag 3 0.256*** 0.202***
(0.0630) (0.0648)
#Regimes: Lag 1 1.061*** 1.066*** 1.019*** 1.023***
(0.0664) (0.0657) (0.0678) (0.0668)
#Regimes: Lag 2 -0.337*** -0.343*** -0.325*** -0.336***
(0.0901) (0.0894) (0.0901) (0.0889)
#Regimes: Lag 3 0.146** 0.147** 0.113* 0.115*
(0.0635) (0.0634) (0.0646) (0.0642)
Nomadic attacks 0.0120** 0.00379 0.0108* 0.00409
(0.00605) (0.00614) (0.00628) (0.00642)
Nomadic attacks: Lag 1 -0.0196*** -0.0137** -0.0116** -0.0182*** -0.0126** -0.0106*
(0.00604) (0.00614) (0.00518) (0.00621) (0.00634) (0.00562)
Lower precipitation 0.0334 -0.0317
(0.100) (0.102)
Lower precipitation: Lag 1 -0.178* -0.153 -0.164*
(0.0967) (0.0991) (0.0941)
Higher precipitation -0.227* -0.118
(0.136) (0.140)
Higher precipitation: Lag 1 0.319** 0.281* 0.225*
(0.142) (0.146) (0.135)
Snow disasters -0.0258 0.0433 0.0533
(0.154) (0.155) (0.153)
Low temperature disasters -0.0328 -0.0981 -0.112
(0.127) (0.131) (0.128)
Temperature 0.00694 0.0358 0.0393
(0.0244) (0.0250) (0.0239)
Nomadic conquest 1 0.177** 0.186*** 0.191***
(0.0695) (0.0711) (0.0683)
Nomadic conquest 2 0.122* 0.137* 0.140*
(0.0726) (0.0734) (0.0714)
Nomadic conquest 3 -0.0366 0.0219 0.0197
(0.0997) (0.101) (0.0943)
Time trend 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203
R-squared 0.743 0.781 0.781 0.765 0.798 0.797
AIC 0.122 0.158 0.150 0.141 0.184 0.162
Constant terms not reported. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
additional nomadic attack in decade t is associated with a 1.2% increase in the probability of
politically fragmentation in China in the same decade, but an attack in the previous decade (at
t− 1) is associated with a larger 1.96% decrease in the probability of politically fragmentation
in decade t. In line with Corollary 4, the relationship between nomadic invasions and political
fragmentation is negative in the long run: each additional nomadic attack is associated with a
decrease in the probability of politically fragmentation in China—or an increase in the probability
of political unification—of 6.3% (= 0.012−0.0196
1−0.906+0.283−0.256). Given that China experienced an average
of 2.5 nomadic attacks per decade, the relationship between nomadic invasions and its political
unity is clearly a significant one.23
In column (b) of Table 2, we replace Fragmentation with #Regime as the dependent variable,
and obtain consistent results: while nomadic attacks appear to have negligible effect on the
23For this estimation and all subsequent ones that we report, we have conducted the Durbin’s h-test to ensure
that the errors are serially independent. In addition, we have also checked that the roots of the characteristic
equation in each specification are all smaller than 1 and therefore the estimation model is ‘dynamically stable’.
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number of regimes in China proper, the lagged effect is significant: every additional nomadic
attack is associated with a decrease in the number of regimes in China proper one decade later
by 1.37%.
One may suspect that political fragmentation could leave China divided and weakened,
and therefore increase the likelihood of nomadic attacks. In other words, there may exist an
endogeneity problem in Equation 1. For our purpose, this source of endogeneity is not an issue.
If indeed political fragmentation had the effect of increasing nomadic attacks, one can verify that
the magnitude of estimates that we have derived so far are biased downwards and the true effect
of nomadic invasions on China’s political unity would be even larger. Nonetheless, as a check in
column (c) we repeat the time-series regression in column (b) but drop the non-lagged nomadic
invasion variable, which is in any case statistically insignificant. This should mitigate some of
the concerns over potential endogeneity since the remaining lagged nomadic invasion variable
is determined before the present period. We find similar results after dropping the non-lagged
nomadic invasion variable: the short run and long run effects are -1.15% (= e−0.0116 − 1) and
-8.53% (= e
−0.0116
1−1.066+0.343−0.147 − 1) respectively.
To see if the results would change under an alternative specification, in columns (d)–(f) we
deviate from the classic ADL model and introduce the control variables as used in Bai and Kung
(2011) into our estimation equation, which now becomes:
yt = φ0 +
p∑
i=1
φiyt−i +
q∑
i=0
µixt−i +
q∑
i=0
ψ1i z1t−i +
q∑
i=0
ψ2i z2t−i + piWt + t (2)
where z1t and z2t are rainfall variables measuring droughts and floods and Wt is a vector of
seven other climatic and historical control variables as discussed previously (Table 1). In Table
2, columns (d), (e), and (f) replicate, respectively, the estimations in columns (a), (b), and (c)
using the new specification. Since Bai and Kung (2011) detect a strong and robust relationship
between the frequency of nomadic invasions and rainfall factors, our introduction of the rainfall
variables and the full range of controls alongside the frequency of nomadic invasions leads to
multicollinearity and increases the standard errors of the estimates. However, as columns (d)–(f)
show, we obtain very similar and statistically significant coefficient estimates. This gives us
confidence in the robustness of our results.
VAR Estimation Following Bai and Kung (2011), we also implement the following vector
autoregression (VAR) as a robustness check:
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Table 3: Robustness Checks: VAR Model
(a) (b)
(a1) (a2) (b1) (b2)
Fragmentation Nomadic attacks #Regimes Nomadic attacks
Fragmentation: Lag 1 0.893*** 2.075***
(0.0665) (0.733)
Fragmentation: Lag 2 -0.317*** -1.631*
(0.0848) (0.935)
Fragmentation: Lag 3 0.225*** -0.377
(0.0656) (0.723)
#Regimes: Lag 1 1.026*** 1.904***
(0.0660) (0.721)
#Regimes: Lag 2 -0.343*** -1.330
(0.0882) (0.963)
#Regimes: Lag 3 0.131** -0.254
(0.0638) (0.696)
Nomadic attacks: Lag 1 -0.0176*** 0.321*** -0.0130** 0.333***
(0.00626) (0.0690) (0.00626) (0.0684)
Nomadic attacks: Lag 2 0.00701 0.257*** 0.000943 0.236***
(0.00657) (0.0724) (0.00654) (0.0715)
Nomadic attacks: Lag 3 -0.00602 -0.0108 -0.00269 0.000803
(0.00638) (0.0703) (0.00632) (0.0690)
Lower precipitation 0.0270 2.550** -0.0450 2.570**
(0.0922) (1.016) (0.0933) (1.019)
Higher precipitation -0.173 -3.376** -0.0561 -3.623***
(0.123) (1.357) (0.126) (1.381)
Snow disasters -0.0189 1.853 0.0358 1.937
(0.153) (1.682) (0.153) (1.669)
Low temperature disasters -0.0421 -0.824 -0.111 -0.822
(0.125) (1.373) (0.127) (1.386)
Temperature -0.0166 -0.372 0.0176 -0.443*
(0.0225) (0.248) (0.0228) (0.249)
Nomadic conquest 1 0.125* -1.484** 0.142** -1.744**
(0.0662) (0.730) (0.0665) (0.726)
Nomadic conquest 2 0.0623 -1.173 0.0911 -1.335*
(0.0692) (0.763) (0.0693) (0.757)
Nomadic conquest 3 -0.159* -3.339*** -0.0663 -3.357***
(0.0909) (1.002) (0.0911) (0.995)
Time trend 0.0007 0.008 0.0006 0.008
(0.0005) (0.006) (0.0006) (0.006)
Observations 203 203 203 203
Constant terms not reported. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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where yt is, respectively, Fragmentation and #Regime in columns (a1) and (b1) of Table 3.
Besides verifying the robustness of the earlier results, the VAR approach also helps to address
any remaining endogeneity concerns since it models the simultaneity of our dependent and main
explanatory variables explicitly.24
As Table 3 illustrates, the estimates from the VAR model share the same order of magnitude
with the results from the ADL estimations in Table 2. The coefficient estimate of Lag-1 nomadic
24As with the ADL estimations, we select the lagged values to minimize the AIC. We have also checked for
autocorrelation and that the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle (hence the VAR model is ‘dynamically stable’).
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attack is -0.0176 in column (a1), compared with -0.0196 in column (a) of the previous table, and
-0.0130 in column (b1), compared with -0.0137 in column (b) of the previous table. This lends
further credence to the robustness of the estimates.
It is worth noting that the climatic variables are statistically insignificant in columns (a1)
and (b1). Any effect of climate change on political unification appear to have worked through
the nomadic invasion channel. Furthermore, our VAR estimation replicates Bai and Kung’s
main finding that nomadic invasions were positively correlated with less rainfall and negatively
correlated with more rainfall (columns a2 and b2). Despite introducing new dependent variables
(Fragmentation and #Regime), their results remain intact in our analysis. Indirectly, this provides
another piece of evidence to support the validity of our empirical exercise.
4.2 Historical Evidence from Europe
We are unable to replicate the empirical exercise for Europe because data on the number of
regimes in Europe only exists on a per century basis. However, European historical patterns do
conform to predictions of our theoretical model.
Europe has historically been politically fragmented; the closest Europe came to be ruled by a
unified political system was under the Roman Empire. The rise of Rome parallels the rise of the
first empire in China (Scheidel, 2009). In terms of the model, one advantage Rome had over
its rivals in the Hellenistic world was a lower θ. Rome’s ability to project power and increase
its resources of manpower was unequalled among European states in antiquity (Eckstein, 2011).
Thus Rome was able to impose centralized rule upon much of Europe. Our model suggests
that two factors can account for the decline of Rome: (1) over time, Rome’s military advantage
(which is inversely related to θRome) declined relative to the military capacities of its rivals such
as the Persian empire or the Germanic confederacies; and (2) these rising threats came from
multiple directions along Rome’s long border.25 Like episodes of dynastic and imperial collapse in
China, the fall of the western Empire was associated with political disintegration and economic
collapse across Europe (Ward-Perkins, 2005). However, unlike in China, all subsequent attempts
to rebuild the Roman Empire failed.
The most successful subsequent attempt to build a European-wide polity was the creation of
a Frankish empire by the Carolingians. The Carolingian dynasty was established by Pippin III
(r. 752–768) and under the reign of Charlemagne (r. 768-814) came to control an empire that
spanned France, parts of Spain and much of Italy, Germany and central Europe (Collins, 1998;
McKitterick, 2008; Costambeys et al., 2011).
Consistent with our model, the Carolingian empire was not long-lasting. It went into decline
25These claims are consistent with the vast historical scholarship on this topic (see Heather, 2006).
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Figure 13: Viking, Magyar, and Muslim Invasions of Western Europe in the Ninth and
Tenth Centuries; The Carolingian Empire after the partition of AD 843.
as the successors of Charlemagne struggled to deal with the external threats posed by the
Magyars, the Vikings, and the Muslims from different fronts (Morrissey, 1997).26 The empire
was divided in 843 and this marks an end of point of Carolingian empire (Figure 13).
In East Francia, a different dynasty, the Ottonians, came to power as a response to the
repeated Magyar invasions and established the Holy Roman Empire. At its height in the eleventh
century, it comprised the modern countries Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Low
Countries, and Switzerland. However, the decline of the Holy Roman Empire began soon after
the Magyars, its main foe, converted to Christianity and served instead as a bulwark against
further barbarian invasions. Increasingly, emperors based in Germany found it difficult to control
their Italian provinces and by the thirteenth century, the Holy Roman Empire was no more than
a loose federation of German principalities.
Incidentally, the threats posed to the Europeans by the Vikings and the Muslims also receded
after the eleventh century. One could argue that from then on, Western Europe no longer
experienced meaningful multi-sided external threats. If this interpretation is correct, our model
predicts that the status quo of political fragmentation would persist, and it did. The Mongol
invasion of Europe in the thirteenth century was too brief to provide a sustained impetus toward
European unification. However, the less dramatic but more sustained rise of the Ottoman
empire after the fifteenth century serves as yet another test of our model and it provides further
26As Spruyt observes ‘the breakup of central authority coincided with the increasing raids by Magyars, Saracens,
and Vikings’ (Spruyt, 1994, 37). Viking raids began in the reign of Charlemagne but greatly increased in ambition
after the death of Louis the Pious exposed the fragility of the Carolingian hegemony and hastened the emergence
of localized regional power centers.
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supporting evidence that our mechanisms are relevant. Iyigun (2008) shows that the external
threat of invasion from the Ottomans between 1410 and 1700 reduced the frequency of interstate
warfare in Europe. Indeed, a comparison of the political maps of central and eastern Europe of
the fourteenth century and seventeenth century indicates that ‘a significant degree of political
consolidation accompanied the Ottoman expansion in continental Europe’ (Iyigun, 2008, 1470).
5 Applying the Model
We are now in a position to use our theory to offer new insights into the choice of capital
city location, differential levels of taxation and military buildup, and differential patterns of
population change at the two ends of Eurasia.
5.1 Locations of Capital Cities
Our model predicts that large empires will locate their capitals in order to respond to the threat
of external invasion. There are numerous examples of empires changing capitals in order to
protect their empires against external enemies; to substantiate our model we focus on examples
from China and Europe.
Consistent with our model, for most of its history, China’s capital city was located in its
northern or northwestern frontier instead of the populous Central Plain or Lower Yangzi Delta.
For the 1,418 years between 221 BC and AD 1911 when China proper was under unified rule,
Beijing and Changan (modern day Xi-an) served as its national capital for 634 years and 553
years respectively, or together 8.4 years out of every 10 years (Wilkinson, 2012).
Changan was China’s preeminent political center in the first millennium (Figure 14a). It was
the capital city of the unified dynasties of Qin (221–206 BC), Former Han and Xin (202 BC–AD
23), Sui (581–618), and Tang (618–907). Figure 14a illustrates two salient characteristics of
Changan’s geographical location that buttress our argument: (1) it was not the population or
economic center of the empire;27 and (2) it shielded China’s populous Central Plain from nomadic
invasions by virtue of its strategic location between the steppe and central-eastern China.
In the second millennium when China’s threat from the north shifted from Inner Asia eastward
to the semi-nomadic lands of Manchuria, Beijing replaced Changan as the new political center of
China. The emergence of Beijing was due to its proximity to the northern frontier—the Chinese
thinker and political theorist Huang Zongxi (1610–1695) likened making Beijing the national
27During the Han dynasty, for example, only 3 million people, or around 4 percent of the Chinese population,
resided in Guanzhong, the region where Changan was located. By contrast, the Guandong region in central-eastern
China was home to 60 percent of the empire’s subjects.
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Figure 14: Capital cities in China and the Roman Empire. Panel (a) depicts the Han
dynasty’s capital city, Changan, and its most populous prefectures. Beijing replaced Changan
as China’s preeminent political center in the second millennium. Panel (b) depicts the
major cities of the Roman Empire. During the Tetrarchy period, there were four capitals:
Trier, Milan, Sirmium, and Nicomedia. Constantinople and Ravenna were the capitals of
the Eastern and Western Empires respectively. Carthage, Alexandria, and Antioch were
the largest cities of the Roman Empire after Rome itself. Adapted from Herrmann (1966),
Skinner et al. (2007), and Talbert (2000).
capital to having the emperor guard his empire’s gates (Huang, 1993).
For the European case, our evidence comes from the Roman Empire—the single long-lasting
empire to span much of the continent in European history. We find strong support for this
prediction of the model. The Roman Republic and Empire expanded symmetrically from the
city of Rome over several centuries to encompass the entirety of the Mediterranean and western
Europe. Over time therefore, the location of the capital became less and less convenient from the
point of view of military operations. This was not a major issue during the first century of the
Empire, but as the severity of the external threats facing the empire grew from the mid-second
century onward emperors spent less and less time in Rome and they eventually set up other
capital cities in which to reside.28 Figure 14b depicts both the old capital of Rome and the
capitals established during the latter part of the third century: Trier on the Rhine frontier,
Milan at entrance of the Alps shielding Italy from invasion, Sirmium on the Danube frontier,
and Nicomedia in the east. Consistent with the predictions of the model, therefore, it was the
28For example, Gallenius (r. 253–268) did not visit Rome until the fifth year of his reign while Diocletian (r.
284–306), who established his capital at Nicomedia in modern day Turkey, did not visit Rome until the twentieth
year of his reign (Rees 2004, 28 and Goldsworthy 2009, 162).
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threat of invasion that drove the choice of capital location for the Roman Empire.29
Importantly, the choice of these new capital cities did not correspond to the largest cities.
After Rome which remained the biggest city in the empire through this period,30 the most
populous cities in the empire were Alexandria with around 600,000 inhabitants, and Antioch
and Carthage with between 300,000–500,000 people (Scheidel, 2013, 78). However, with the
exception of Antioch these cities were far from the frontiers and were not chosen as capital cities
for this reason.31
When the emperor Constantine (r. 306–338) established a new permanent capital at the small
Greek city of Byzantine, renamed as Constantinople, he choose this location not because it had
any economic significance at the time, but because it was close to both the eastern frontier of the
empire and to the important Danube front where the empire faced some of its most determined
enemies.32
Interestingly, the lessons of Chinese and Roman history also provide ample evidence to
support our assumption in the model that rules out the possibility of a state maintaining two
or more comparable political-military centers. During the mid-Tang dynasty, the Xuanzong
emperor (r. 712–756) implemented a polycentric political-military system and devolved much
of the central government’s political authority to frontier military governors with the goal of
improving military responsiveness and effectiveness. However, Xuanzong’s favorite and most
powerful frontier governor, An Lushan, infamously revolted in 755 as the military might of An’s
army fed popular suspicion of his political ambitions, which ironically compelled An to revolt. A
similar development took place during the early Ming dynasty with the implementation of a de
facto twin-capital system in which the emperor resided in the populous south and his uncle, the
Prince of Yan, coordinated border defense in the strategic north. The arrangement again proved
unstable and mutual suspicion led to the outbreak of a bloody civil war in 1399 with the Prince
of Yan emerging as the eventual victor. So as to prevent history from repeat itself, the usurper
moved the capital city from Nanjing (the ‘southern capital’) to Beijing (the ‘northern capital’)
in order to maintain direct control of the large army along the northern border.
Similarly, the Roman Empire was not able to maintain multiple capitals within a single
empire for a long period of time. The fourfold division of the empire inaugurated by Diocletian
(r. 284–306), known as the Tetrarchy, did not last long beyond his retirement in 306 and led to a
29Rees notes that ‘[t]he motivation for this move away from the ancient capital seems to have been strategic
. . . the north Italian cities, Milan, Ravenna, and Aquileia, were closer to the main military areas than Rome was’
(Rees, 2004, 27).
30Though its population declined from a peak of 1 million in the 2nd century to approximately 750,000 in the
4th century.
31Antioch was in fact a major base to fight the Persians even if it was not officially a capital city. For example,
the Emperor Julian (r. 361–363) spent nine months in Antioch preparing for his invasion of Persia.
32For example, see Odahl (2004, 232) and Goldsworthy (2009, 186).
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series of civil wars that only ended with Constantine’s reunification in 324. Civil wars reoccured
during periods of imperial division in 337–350, 360–361, 383–388, 392–395. By the end of the
fourth century, the centrifugal forces affecting the empire led to the permanent division of the
empire into East and West and from this point on the two empires coexisted as separate political
entities until the fall of the Western Empire in 476.
5.2 Taxation and Army Size
Our model predicts that taxation would be higher in Europe relative to China (Corollary 6).
This contradicts traditional comparative accounts of Europe and China, which complained that
economic development in China was retarded by high levels of taxation (e.g. Jones 2003), but
it is consistent with recent scholarship in economic history. Tax rates in Europe were high
and especially so in the Dutch Republic and England after 1689 (Hoffman and Norberg, 1994;
Bonney, 1999).33 In contrast, taxes were comparatively low in China. Karaman and Pamuk
(2013) provide data on taxes revenues for a range of European countries. Table 4 depicts this
data in conjunction with estimates of per capita and total tax revenue from China from Sng
(2014). Tax revenue per capita in France was lower than in either the Dutch Republic or England,
but it remained much higher than in China.34 The average European per capita level of taxation
as measured in silver was roughly four times higher compared to China. As China was a net
importer of silver, the value of silver in China might have been higher than in Europe. Following
Ma (2013), we use the bare-bones subsistence basket constructed in Allen et al. (2011) to estimate
the tax burden in Europe and China and obtain similar results. Clearly, as Corollary 6 suggests,
taxation was lighter under politically centralized China than it was in fragmented Europe.35
By and large, the taxes raised by European states were spent on warfare.36 Scholars have
33This increase in tax revenue obviously implies that the tax revenues collected by the central state were lower
before 1700. However, this does not mean that the total level of taxation was lower when one includes feudal dues,
local taxes, and tithes to the Church. Much of the increase in tax revenue collected by centralized states came
at the expense of these forms of taxation which were generally restricted and abolished in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. For a comparison for taxes in England and France in the seventeenth century see Johnson
and Koyama (2014a).
34Johnson and Koyama (2014b) document the increase in tax revenues at a regional level in France throughout
the seventeenth century.
35Our hypothesis complements a strand of the literature that attributes light taxation in China to a severe
principal-agent problem in its government (Kiser and Tong, 1992; Ma, 2013; Sng, 2014; Sng and Moriguchi, 2014).
Instead of focusing on agency costs in tax collection as this literature does, we look at agency costs in public
goods provision (as argued in Section 3.1, agency costs in military control lead to the deterioration of military
strength over distance) and derive similar results.
36In war years, over 75 percent of French revenue was spent on the military in the seventeenth century (Félix
and Tallett, 2009, 155); in eighteenth century Britain, this figure varied between 61 and 74 per cent (Brewer,
1988, 32); while the peacetime military budget of Prussia during the eighteenth century accounted for 80 per cent
of central government expenditure (Wilson, 2009, 119).
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Per Capita Tax Revenue (silver grams) Total Tax Revenue (silver tons)
1700 1750 1780 1700 1750 1780
England 91.9 109.1 172.3 559.4 821.1 1627.3
France 43.5 48.7 77.6 878.2 1081.2 1962
Dutch Republic 210.6 189.4 228.2 400.6 367.6 466.8
Spain 28.6 46.2 59.0 219.2 439.3 642.5
European average 52.1 58.0 (27%) 77.3 278.2 403.2 711.5
China 10.4 11.8 (6%) 9.2 1812.1 2633.3 2769.3
Table 4: Per capita tax revenue in grams of silver. European average tax revenue includes
Venice, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Poland-Lithuania in addition to England, France,
Dutch Republic and Spain. Sources: Karaman and Pamuk (2013) and Sng (2014). In
parentheses we include a comparison of per capita tax revenue as a proportion of ‘bare-bones’
subsistence in 1750 as measured by Allen et al. (2011).
long noted that Europe was the ‘seat of Mars’.37 Figure 4a confirms this impression for the
period between 1400 and 1700. Furthermore, the proportion of individuals under arms in Europe
was much higher than in China (Table 5).
This fact can be explained in terms of Corollary 1 which predicts that states under interstate
competition will invest heavily in their military. Table 5 indicates that in the middle of the
eighteenth century the percentage of individuals in the army in Europe was between 1 and 2
percent of the population. In contrast, in Qing China the proportion of the population in the
army was at most 0.4 percent of the population.38
The data in Table 5 reflects the army sizes of the major European military powers in the
eighteenth century. Obtaining consistent data for earlier periods in Europe is extremely difficult.
We are aware that the Military Revolution led to a dramatic rise in the size of the standing armies
of the major European powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Parker, 1976, 1988)
and that the size of standing armies in Europe in earlier periods was much smaller. However,
this does not mean that the proportion of the population under arms was smaller in the earlier
centuries as endemic warfare compelled a large proportion of the population to serve as warriors
at some point.39 In the medieval period while there were no professional armies, so to speak,
a significant fraction of the eligible male population might be expected to service in the army
37For example ‘No other continent in recorded history fought so frequently, for such long periods, killing such
a high proportion of its population’ (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013, 168). For a general discussion see Tilly (1990).
38In China as in Europe, the majority of government revenue was spent on the military. The main difference
was that China’s total military spending was much lower. As Vries (2012) observed, ‘with roughly twenty times
as many inhabitants, China, in real terms, per year on average only spent roughly 1.8 times as much on the
military as Britain did during the period from the 1760s to the 1820s. Per capita in real terms Britain thus spent
more than ten times as much on its army and navy than China’ (Vries, 2012, 12).
39In the early middle ages, Heather (2009, 59-60) notes that standard estimates of the proportion of warriors
to non-warriors in the Germanic tribes was between one to four or one to five, implying that 20 to 25 percent of
the entire population could be under arms during periods of war (which was endemic).
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Number of Soldiers % of Population
Britain 79,000 1.2%
France 183,000 0.7 %
Dutch Republic 45,000 (1750s)a 2%
Spain 109,000 (1750s) 1.2%
Austria 190,000 (1778) 1.06%
Prussia 133,000 (1751)b 3.5%
Russia 408,000 (1780) 1.7 %
Saxony 23,000 (1750s) —
Bavaria 15,000 (1750s) —
Hanover 37,283 (1750s)c —
Piedmont 45,000 (1750s) —
Sweden 35,000 (1756)d 2%
European total/average 1,252,000 1.67%
China 800,000 0.37%
Table 5: Size of standing armies in China and Europe in the mid-eighteenth century.
Sources: Wang (1985), Gallenga (1855, 194), Sichart (1898), Duffy (1977, 212), Kennedy
(1987), and Doyle (1992, 241–245); Population data from McEvedy and Jones (1978). Rasler
and Thompson (1994) contains alternative army size estimates but these do not affect our
comparison between China and Europe. Finally, we do not report European naval strength,
but the Chinese navy was small in this period and is reflected in the figure that we report.
aDuring earlier periods Dutch military strength was greater. The Dutch army was 93,000 in 1690.
bBy 1786 Prussian army was 190,000.
cSize of Hanoverian army fluctuated from 19,000 to 49,000 during the eighteenth century (Sichart, 1898).
dThe Swedish army was much larger in earlier periods: 100,000 in 1710 (Kennedy, 1987).
during wartime while even in peacetime feudal lords maintained large numbers of armed retainers.
5.3 Population cycles in China and Europe.
Our model also offers new insights into the consequences of the persistence of political centraliza-
tion in China and fragmentation in Europe. Corollary 7 predicts that population growth should
be more variable under political centralization because political centralization is associated with
lower taxes during peacetime but also greater vulnerability to external shocks. We provide
evidence in support of this proposition by drawing on population data from China and Europe.
McEvedy and Jones (1978) provide comparable population estimates for the past two thousand
years. Figure 15a presents their population estimates for China and Europe. It shows that the
population growth of China was more variable than that of Europe. Figure 15b, which shows the
percentage population change, confirms this finding. It is evident that the time series of Chinese
population display greater variance. Interestingly, there is no visible difference in population
variation at the two ends of Eurasia when they were ruled by empires (before AD 400) and when
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Figure 15: Population Estimates in China and Europe (McEvedy and Jones, 1978)
(a) Estimated population levels (b) Percentage Change
they were fragmented (400–600), it is only after the consolidation of political centralization in
China and fragmentation in Europe that the differences in population change patterns emerged.
In addition, in Appendix A.9 we fit the population estimates with polynomials up to the
sixth order and find that (i) it is easier to fit the European population estimates than it is to fit
the Chinese population estimates because the latter are more scattered, and (ii) even if we set
aside differences in the degree of goodness of fit, Europe’s fitted trend line is smoother than the
Chinese one.
We use McEvedy and Jones (1978) because they provide estimates for both China and Europe
over a long period of time. However, since they report data for every 50, 100, or 200 years, the
resulting time series is necessarily smoother than would be the case if data was available at a
higher frequency. In fact, this potential problem biases us against finding a difference between
the population fluctuations in China and Europe as there are several well-known sharp declines
in Chinese population that are either absent or moderated in the McEvedy and Jones (1978)
data.
Figure 16 displays a higher frequency population series from Cao (2000).40 This data series
is consistent with historical accounts which associate external invasions and political collapses
with large declines in population. The fall of the Early and Later Han, Sui dynasties, the An
40We use the population estimates provided in Cao (2000) because of its coverage and relative accuracy.
The plunges in China’s population depicted in Figure 15 would appear even more severe if we had used official
historical statistics. For example, official historical records suggest that China’s population fell from more than
50 million to 7 million in the third century after the collapse of the Han dynasty. A substantial amount of this
population ‘loss’ was likely due to the state’s inability to keep accurate records during times of crises instead of
actual deaths. By contrast, Cao (2000) puts the late third-century estimate at 23 million instead of 7 million.
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Figure 16: Estimated population levels and major political crises in China (Cao, 2000)
Lushan Rebellion, the fall of the Northern Song dynasty, the Mongol invasions, and the end of
the Yuan and Ming dynasties are all visible in the figure.
For example, the Mongol invasions are associated with a sharp population collapse. Kuhn
observes that ‘[p]opulation figures took another dramatic turn downward between 1223 and 1264,
and by 1292 in the whole of China the population had decreased by roughly 30 million, or one
third of the population, to 75 million. This was probably due to a combination of factors—warfare
in north China, the Mongol invasions, and the bubonic plague or other epidemics. Whatever the
causes, this was a decline in human population on a magnitude that the world has seldom seen’
(Kuhn, 2009, 75). The fall of the Yuan Dynasty is thought to have caused the population to
fall again by approximately 23 percent. In contrast, historians of Europe report only one major
Europe-wide collapse in population after the fall of the Roman Empire and this is the Black
Death of the mid-fourteenth century.
5.4 Implications for Economic Growth
The start-stop nature of population growth and economic development in China that is predicted
in our model and witnessed in history is potentially important in helping to account for China’s
failure to achieve modern economic growth before 1800.
According to unified growth theory, population growth in the Malthusian era was associated
with economic growth through its effect on (a) the supply of innovative ideas, (b) the demand
for new technologies, (c) the rate of technological diffusion, (d) the division of labor, and (e) the
scope for trade (Galor, 2005, 239). Once the stock of technological knowledge becomes large
enough, however, there is an incentive for parents to invest in human capital for their children.
As a result parents switch from investing in a large number of children with no or low amounts
36
Unified China; Divided Europe Ko, Koyama, and Sng
of human capital to investing in a small-number of higher quality children thereby generating a
demographic transition and a shift to a modern growth regime in which a sustained increase in
per capita income can take place. This scale effect is deterministic; it predicts that the transition
to sustained economic growth is inevitable and—all else equal—economic growth should be
most likely to occur in the largest economy as that is where factors such as learning-by-doing,
technological diffusion, and the supply of innovative ideas should be largest.
This prediction is consistent with much of history; until around 1300 China was the most
innovative part of the world economy (Mokyr, 1990; Needham, 1995; Lin, 1995). However,
sustained economic growth did not begin in China even though it remained the world’s largest
economy until well into the 1800s.41 Growth theory often accounts for this puzzle by appealing
to differences in political or economic institutions and how they shape the incentive to innovate.
In this paper we suggest an alternative and complementary mechanism to explain why sustained
economic growth did not first take place in China. As a unified empire China was more vulnerable
to periodic collapses and population shocks as a direct or indirect consequence of the threat
of external invasion. This undermined the gradual accumulation of technological knowledge
that plays such an important role in generating the transition from stagnation to growth in the
theoretical growth literature.
We base this argument on Aiyar et al. (2008) who propose a model in which knowledge is
embedded in new intermediate goods. Negative shocks that cause the extent of the market to
contract, including a fall in the population, can cause the production of some intermediate goods
to be abandoned and this leads to a decline in knowledge or technological regress.42 Adding
this insight to our theory suggests that the higher variance of population growth in China—a
hitherto overlooked factor in the study of the Great Divergence—could help explain its slower
technological growth relative to Europe in the long run.
41For actual GDP estimates, see Maddison (2003) and Broadberry et al. (2012); Broadberry (2013).
42In a nutshell, their model studies an economy governed by Malthusian dynamics with population N = N¯(K)
with a number of intermediate goods F = F¯ (K). F is a measure of technological sophistication as each
intermediate good g(l) where l ∈ [0, Ft] is used to produce final output. There is a fixed cost associated with
producing each intermediate good and for the production of each intermediate good to be viable it has to generate
enough revenue to cover this fixed cost.
Suppose there is a negative shock to the population: N0 < N¯ . In this case, the number of varieties of
intermediate goods produced in equilibrium falls due to the decline in the size of the market to F ∗(No). This fall
in the number of varieties also results in a decline in knowledge as technological knowledge is embodied in the
production of intermediate goods. Negative shocks to the population do not only lead to a fall in the rate of
technological progress as in standard models of long-run growth; negative shocks actually result in a decline in
the stock of knowledge.
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6 Conclusion
The idea that Europe’s political and economic success is related to its political fragmentation
goes back to the Enlightenment. Montesquieu noted that in contrast to Asia where strong nations
are able to conquer and subdue their neighbors, in ‘Europe on the contrary, strong nations are
opposed to the strong; and those who join each other have nearly the same courage. This is the
reason of the weakness of Asia and of the strength of Europe; of the liberty of Europe, and of
the slavery of Asia’ (Montesquieu, 1989, 266).
In this paper we have proposed a unified theory of the origins, persistence, and consequences
of political centralization and fragmentation in China and Europe. We build on the argument
that external threats were a powerful force for political unification in China, but were less of a
factor in Europe. Our theory suggests that political centralization should indeed be stable in
China, but not in Europe, and that this centralization was beneficial from a static perspective
as it minimized costly interstate competition. However, we also show that in the event of an
external invasion a centralized empire such as China was less robust than a decentralized state
system.
Our theory provides a novel institutional channel through which geography could have shaped
economic outcomes in Eurasia. It complements and enriches many existing explanations that
have suggested that political fragmentation played an important role in the rise of Europe. For
example, Tilly (1990) analyzed the factors that shaped Europe’s high level of fragmentation
at the end of the middle ages and the forces that gave rise to the emergence of modern nation
states by the nineteenth century. He argued that the ‘broad urban column that reached roughly
southwest from the Italian peninsula to southern England dominated the map of fragmented
sovereignty’ as the existence of capital-intensive city states along this corridor prevented the
emergence of permanent large empires in continent Europe (Tilly, 1990, 133).43
Tilly’s theory is important and influential but it does not explain the existence of independent
city states in Europe in 1500—which he took as given. Indeed other scholars have suggested
that independent city-states were able to flourish in this part of Europe precisely because of
the breakup of the Carolingian empire and the failure of subsequent Holy Roman Emperors to
reunify Charlemagne’s kingdom (Stasavage, 2011).44 Our theory complements Tilly’s hypothesis
as we seek to explain why no long-lasting empire was sustainable after the Fall of the Roman
43Similar arguments are also developed by Spruyt (1994) and Finer (1999).
44John Hall expresses this argument well, noting that ‘the North Italian cities were themselves the creation of
absence of a single centre of power in Europe’ and observing that ‘[h]ow much they owed to their freedom from
interference and freedom to experiment is simply seen: once they became part of the Spanish mini-empire they
contributed nothing new to European civilization’ (Hall, 1985, 136).
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Empire and hence why it was possible for independent city states to survive in a fragmented
Europe.
Other scholars have argued that decentralization gave Europe an edge in the Great Divergence
because it led to greater innovation (Mokyr, 1990; Diamond, 1997; Lagerlof, 2014); support for
merchants (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986) or political freedoms and representation (Hall, 1985).
Recent work has also shown how the consequences of political fragmentation interacted with
the Black Death to raise incomes and urbanization in Europe (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013b).
Likewise, our theory complements these existing arguments, but we emphasize the significance of
one previously neglected consequence of political centralization in China. There were periods of
economic expansion, innovation, and population growth in China, but these were brought to
a halt by external invasions and political crises. It was these population crises, we conjecture,
that help to explain why China did not enter a period of sustained economic growth in the
preindustrial era. In contrast, Europe’s polycentric system of states gave it the institutional
robustness that was one of the preconditions for modern economic growth to occur.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Location of Nomadic Invasions
Phase Century Nomadic Peoples W. Europe Russia China
1st 8th–2nd BC Scythians
2nd
2nd BC Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu)
2nd BC Yuezhi (Yüeh-chih)
3rd
4th To-pa (Toba Turks)
5th Huns
4th
6th Tu-chueh (Göktu˜rks)
6th Ruren (Juanjuan)
7th Avars
8th Bulgars
7th Khazar Turks
9th Magyars
9th Uygurs
5th
10th Khitans
11th Pechenegs and Kipchaks
12th Jurchens
6th
13th Mongols
14th Tatars
7th
15th Oirots
17th Manchus
Table 6: Major waves of nomadic invasions. Source: Chaliand (2005). It is evident that
China faced a greater threat from the steppe invaders that did Europe.
46
Unified China; Divided Europe Ko, Koyama, and Sng
A.2 The Multidirectional Threat in Europe
Invader Date of Invasion Location of Invasion Direction of threat
Huns c. 370–450 Italy, France, Balkens East
Avars 580 South-Eastern Europe East
Bulgars c. 850 South-Eastern Europe East
Arabs 711 Spain South
Arabs 721 France South
Arabs 732 France South
Vikings* 793–1066 Britain North
Vikings* c. 810–1000 France North
Vikings* c. 810–1000 Low Countries North
Arabs 831 Sicily South
Arabs 840 Crete South
Arabs 846 Italy South
Magyars 907 Germany East
Magyars 917 France East
The Almohads 1172 Spain South
Mongols 1240 Poland East
Mongols 1241 Hungary East
Mongols 1241 Croatia East
The Marinids 1340 Gibraltar South
Ottomans 1371 Serbia South-East
Ottomans 1385 Albania South-East
Ottomans 1463 Bosnia South-East
Ottomans 1479 Hungary South East
Ottomans 1480 Italy South East
Crimean Tatars 1480–1507 Poland East
Crimean Tatars 1507–1570 Russia East
Ottomans 1526 Hungary South-East
Ottomans 1529 Austria South-East
Ottomans 1541 Hungary South-East
Ottomans 1565 Malta South-East
Ottomans 1573 Cyprus South-East
Crimean Tatars 1571 Russia East
Crimean Tatars 1577, 1584, 1590 Poland East
Ottomans 1573 Cyprus South-East
Crimean Tatars 1621 Poland East
Crimean Tatars 1648 Poland East
Crimean Tatars 1667 Poland East
Ottomans 1669 Crete South-East
Ottomans 1683 Austria South-East
Table 7: The multi-directional threat. A list of invasions of Europe from the Fall of
the Roman Empire onwards. We list invasions attempts that failed as well as those that
succeeded. *We count the Vikings as external invaders—due to their different religion
and distinct culture they were seen as outsider invaders by contemporaries. But from the
perspective of our model we consider later Swedish or Danish campaigns in Europe as
instances of interstate competition.
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A.3 Definition
The gross damage t distance away from the frontier is max {λ(Λ, t), 0}, and the military strength
t distance away from the capital city of regime i is max{m(Mi, t), 0}.
Under interstate competition, a location x ∈ [0, Gl] is controlled by regime l if regime l has
a stronger military strength at its capital than regime r, i.e., m(Ml, 0) ≥ m(Mr, 1−Gl −Gr). A
location x ∈ [Gl, 1−Gr] is controlled by regime l if regime l has a stronger military strength
than regime r at x, i.e., m(Mi, x−Gi) ≥ m(Mj, (1− x)−Gj). Locations controlled by regime r
are defined in the same way. We restrict our attention to Gl +Gr ≤ 1 so that the capital city of
each regime always falls within the region that it controls.
The border b between two regimes is defined as the point between their capital cities where
the regimes are equal in military strength. Formally, b ∈ [Gl, 1−Gr] solves the following
equation:
m(Ml, b−Gl) = m(Mr, (1− b)−Gr).
If such a location does not exist, it implies that one of the two regimes does not control any
subset of the line. In this case, we assume that b = 0 if m(Ml, 0) < m(Mr, 1 − Gr − Gl) and
b = 1 if m(Ml, 1 − Gr − Gl) > m(Mr, 0). Summing up, let bˆ be defined by m(Ml, bˆ − Gl) =
m(Mr, (1− bˆ)−Gr), we have:
b =

0
1
bˆ
if m(Ml, 0) < m(Mr, 1−Gr −Gl),
if m(Ml, 1−Gr −Gl) > m(Mr, 0),
otherwise.
Let κi(x) = λ(Λ, t)−m(Mi, t) denote the net damage of the external threat at x (controlled
by regime i). A location x ∈ [0, 1] is protected by regime i from the external threat originated
from x = 0 if there exists 0 ≤ x′ ≤ x such that κi (x′) ≤ 0. If the external threat originates
from x = 1, similar definition applies. Let Di = {x ∈ [0, 1] : x is controlled by i and κi(x) ≤ 0}
denote the interval or the set of locations that is protected from the external threat by regime
i. Because of the revolution constraint, we assume that regime i’s net revenue is −∞ unless at
least δ fraction of the interval controlled by regime i is protected.
If the continent is ruled by one single regime, the net revenue of regime e is:
Ve =
{
y − c (Me)
−∞
if |De| ≥ δ,
otherwise,
Under interstate competition, the net revenues of regimes l and r are given by:
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Vl =
{
by − c(Ml)
−∞
if b > 0, |Dl| ≥ bδ and Gl +Gr ≤ 1,
otherwise,
and
Vr =
{
(1− b) y − c(Mr)
−∞
if b < 1, |Dr| ≥ (1− b) δ and Gl +Gr ≤ 1,
otherwise,
respectively.
A.4 Proposition 1
We restate Proposition 1 with technical details.
Proposition 1. When the threat is two-sided:
1. If Λ ≤ ΛI , M∗e = 0 and G∗e ∈ [0, 1];
2. There exists ΛII > ΛI such that for all Λ > ΛII , G∗e =
1
2
and M∗e > 0;
3. If ΛI < Λ ≤ ΛII , G∗e = 1− x∗ (Λ)− δ and M∗e > 0;
When the threat is one-sided:
4. If Λ ≤ Λ¯I , M∗e = 0 and G∗e ∈ [0, 1];
5. If Λ > Λ¯I , G∗e = 1− δ and M∗e > 0.
Proof. First, consider a two-sided threat.
(1) If Λ ≤ ΛI , the optimal military investment is zero as long as the capital is located between
0 and 1. Since regime e’s payoff is decreasing in its military investment, it is optimal to invest
zero.
(2-3) Given that the two-sided threat is symmetric, there is no loss of generality if we assume
Ge ≤ 1/2. Since regime e always receives gross tax revenue y, its optimization problem can be
rewritten as:
min
Ge,Me
c (Me)
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subject to
λ (Λ, a) ≤ m (Me, Ge − a) ,
λ (Λ, 1− z) ≤ m (Me, z −Ge) ,
z − a ≥ δ, and
a ≤ Ge ≤ z
where a and z are, respectively, the leftmost and rightmost locations in the empire that suffer
zero net damage when the military investment is Me.
If Me = 0 satisfies every inequality, then the optimal solution is a corner one and regime e
invests zero in the military. This is the case when Λ ≤ ΛI (as discussed above).
Now consider the case when the solution is interior, i.e., Me > 0. Note that the first inequality
must bind in equilibrium. Otherwise, regime e can increase its net tax revenue by reducing Me
and increasing Ge. Hence, we have:
λ (Λ, a) = m (Me, Ge − a)
Next consider the two cases when (i) the second inequality is binding, and (ii) when it does
not bind.
Case (i): if λ (Λ, 1− z) = m (Me, z −Ge), it is because Λ exceeds a certain threshold value
(since ∂λ/∂Λ > 0). Let ΛII denote this threshold. Note that in this case, the third inequality
automatically binds, i.e., z = a+ δ. Hence, we have:
λ (Λ, a) = m (Me, Ge − a) , and
λ (Λ, 1− δ − a) = m (Me, δ + a−Ge) .
Applying total differentiation:[
λ2 (Λ, a) +m2 (Me, Ge − a) −m1 (Me, Ge − a)
−λ2 (Λ, 1− δ − a)−m2 (Me, δ + a−Ge) −m1 (Me, δ + a−Ge)
][
da
dMe
]
=
[
−λ1 (Λ, a)
−λ1 (Λ, 1− δ − a)
]
dΛ +
[
m2 (Me, Ge − a)
−m2 (Me, δ + a−Ge)
]
dGe
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It is easy to show that
∆ =
∣∣∣∣∣ λ2 (Λ, a) +m2 (Me, Ge − a) −m1 (Me, Ge − a)−λ2 (Λ, 1− δ − a)−m2 (Me, δ + a−Ge) −m1 (Me, δ + a−Ge)
∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 because m1 > 0, λ2 < 0 and m2 < 0.
Hence
dMe
dGe
=
∣∣∣∣∣ λ2 (Λ, a) +m2 (Me, Ge − a) −m2 (Me, Ge − a)−λ2 (Λ, 1− δ − a)−m2 (Me, δ + a−Ge) −m2 (Me, δ + a−Ge)
∣∣∣∣∣
∆
< 0 because λ2 < 0 and m2 < 0.
Since ∂c/∂Me > 0 and therefore ∂Ve/∂Me < 0, we have
dVe
dGe
=
∂Ve
∂Me
dMe
dGe
> 0.
Hence, to maximize its net tax revenue, regime e should locate its capital as close to 1/2 as
possible. This implies that G∗e = 1/2, and a =
1
2
(1− δ). The optimal military spending M∗e
satisfies:
λ
(
Λ,
1
2
(1− δ)
)
= m (M∗e , δ/2) .
Case (ii): if λ (Λ, 1− z) < m (Me, z −Ge), then x∗ (Λ) < 1/2, which in turn implies that:
z = 1− x∗ (Λ) .
Otherwise, regime e can increase its net tax revenue by reducing Me and Ge simultaneously. By
the same reasoning, the third inequality must bind in equilibrium:
G∗e = a = z − δ.
Therefore, the optimal military spending M∗e must satisfy:
λ (Λ, 1− x∗ (Λ)− δ) = m (M∗e , 0) .
Cases (i) and (ii) denote point 2 and point 3 of Proposition 1 respectively. The threshold ΛII
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is the solution to the following system of equations:
λ
(
ΛII ,
1
2
(1− δ)
)
= m (Me, δ/2) , and
λ (ΛII , 1− x∗ (ΛII)− δ) = m (Me, 0) .
Finally, we consider a one-sided threat.
(4) If Λ ≤ Λ¯I , then x∗ (Λ) ≤ 1− δ so that the fraction of protected area is no less than δ even
if there is no military investment. Since regime e’s payoff is decreasing in its military investment,
the optimal military investment is zero and the capital city is located between 0 and 1.
(5) If x∗ (Λ) > 1− δ, the regime has to make a strictly positive military investment. Since
military strength decreases over distance (∂m/∂t < 0), regime e should locate its capital city
at the point where the revolution constraint just binds. This implies that G∗e = 1− δ and M∗e
solves λ (Λ, 1− δ) = m (M∗e , 0).
A.5 Proposition 2
Before proving Proposition 2, it is useful to characterize the outcome of interstate competition
in the absence of an external threat (Λ = 0).
Lemma 1. When there is no external threat, given the locations of capital cities Gl and Gr, the
equilibrium military investments M∗l and M∗r satisfy:
−m1 (M∗l , b−Gl)
m2 (M∗l , b−Gl) +m2 (M∗r , 1− b−Gr)
y − ∂c (M
∗
l )
∂Ml
= 0,
−m1 (M∗r , 1− b−Gr)
m2 (M∗l , b−Gl) +m2 (M∗r , 1− b−Gr)
y − ∂c (M
∗
r )
∂Mr
= 0,
and the equilibrium locations of capital cities G∗l and G∗r satisfy:(
∂b
∂Gl
+
∂b
∂M∗l
∂M∗l
∂Gl
+
∂b
∂M∗r
∂M∗r
∂Gl
)
y − ∂c
∂M∗l
∂M∗l
∂Gl
= 0,
−
(
∂b
∂Gr
+
∂b
∂M∗l
∂M∗l
∂Gr
+
∂b
∂M∗r
∂M∗r
∂Gr
)
y − ∂c
∂M∗r
∂M∗r
∂Gr
= 0.
Proof. Since the border b is determined by:
m (Ml, b−Gl) = m (Mr, 1− b−Gr) ,
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By total differentiation, we have
(m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, 1− b−Gr)) db
= −m1 (Ml, b−Gl) dMl +m1 (Mr, 1− b−Gr) dMr
+m2 (Ml, b−Gl) dGl −m2 (Mr, 1− b−Gr) dGr,
so that
∂b
∂Ml
=
−m1 (Ml, b−Gl)
m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, 1− b−Gr) > 0,
and
∂b
∂Mr
=
m1 (Mr, 1− b−Gr)
m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, 1− b−Gr) < 0,
since m1 > 0 and m2 < 0. In addition,
∂2b
∂M2l
=
− (m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, Gr − b))m11 (Ml, b−Gl) +m1 (Ml, b−Gl)m21 (Ml, b−Gl)
(m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, Gr − b))2
,
which implies that the sufficient conditions for ∂2b
∂M2l
≤ 0 are m11 ≤ 0 and m21 ≤ 0. The same
conditions would ensure that ∂2b/∂M2r ≥ 0.
Now, consider the second stage of interstate competition. Given Gl and Gr, the optimization
problems for regimes l and r are
max
Ml
Vl = b (Gl, Gr,Ml,Mr) y − c (Ml) , and
max
Mr
Vr = (1− b (Gl, Gr,Ml,Mr))y − c (Mr) .
The respective FOCs are
∂b
∂Ml
y − ∂c
∂Ml
= 0, and
− ∂b
∂Mr
y − ∂c
∂Mr
= 0,
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which implies that
−m1 (Ml, b−Gl)
m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, 1− b−Gr)y −
∂c
∂Ml
= 0, and
−m1 (Mr, 1− b−Gr)
m2 (Ml, b−Gl) +m2 (Mr, 1− b−Gr)y −
∂c
∂Mr
= 0.
Under our setup, it is never an equilibrium for regimes under interstate competition to invest
zero in the military, i.e., it must be the case that M∗l > 0 and M∗r > 0. The SOCs are guaranteed
if ∂2b/∂M2l ≤ 0 and ∂2b/∂M2r ≥ 0, since ∂2c/∂2Ml < 0 and ∂2c/∂2Mr < 0.
Given some second-stage equilibrium military investments M∗l (Gl, Gr) and M∗r (Gl, Gr),
consider the first stage of interstate competition where regimes l and r decide their capital city
locations:
max
Gl
Vl = b (Gl, Gr,M
∗
l (Gl, Gr) ,M
∗
r (Gl, Gr)) y − c (M∗l (Gl, Gr)) , and
max
Gr
Vr = (1− b (Gl, Gr,M∗l (Gl, Gr) ,M∗r (Gl, Gr)))y − c (M∗r (Gl, Gr)) .
The respective FOCs are(
∂b
∂Gl
+
∂b
∂M∗l
∂M∗l
∂Gl
+
∂b
∂M∗r
∂M∗r
∂Gl
)
y − ∂c
∂M∗l
∂M∗l
∂Gl
= 0, and
−
(
∂b
∂Gr
+
∂b
∂M∗l
∂M∗l
∂Gr
+
∂b
∂M∗r
∂M∗r
∂Gr
)
y − ∂c
∂M∗r
∂M∗r
∂Gr
= 0.
With the above results, we can restate Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Political Fragmentation). Let δˆ denote the fraction of the continent that is
protected from the external threat in equilibrium (i.e. δˆ = |Dl| + |Dr|). When the threat is
two-sided:
1. There exists a threshold threat level ΛIII such that if Λ ≤ ΛIII , the revolution constraints
do not bind and δˆ ≥ δ. The equilibrium military investments and location of capitals are
the same as in the case when Λ = 0.
2. Otherwise, the revolution constraints bind and δˆ = δ.
Proof. Consider the symmetric equilibrium: M∗l = M∗r = M∗, G∗l = G∗r = G∗. Let ΛIII denote
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the value of Λ that solves:
λ
(
ΛIII ,
1
2
(1− δ)
)
= m
(
M∗, G∗ − 1
2
(1− δ)
)
.
It is clear that if Λ ≤ ΛIII , the revolution constraints of the two regimes do not bind, and vice
versa.
A.6 Proposition 3
Proposition 3 (Viability). Under a one-sided threat, the net tax revenue of regime e is always
larger than the sum of net tax revenues of regimes l and r. If the threat is sufficiently large,
regime e is viable but regimes l and r are not. Under a moderate and two-sided threat, the net
tax revenue of regime e is decreasing in θ but the sum of net tax revenues for regimes l and r are
increasing in θ.
Proof. First, consider the case of a one-sided threat. Suppose that, contrary to Proposition 3,
V ∗e < V
∗
l + V
∗
r ,
then regime e can mimic the choices of regime l, set Ge = G∗l and Me = M∗l , and obtain a
payoff that is weakly greater than the sum of the net tax revenues of regimes l and r, which is a
contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that
V ∗e ≥ V ∗l + V ∗r .
In fact, the inequality has to be strict since regime r makes a non-zero military investment. Note
that both V ∗e and V ∗l + V ∗r are decreasing in Λ. As Λ rises, for sufficiently large Λ, V ∗l + V ∗r will
turn negative while V ∗e is still positive.
Next, consider the case of a moderate, two-sided threat (ΛI < Λ ≤ ΛIII).
For a centralized regime, these are two subcases to consider: if ΛI < Λ ≤ ΛII ,
λ (Λ, 1− x∗ (Λ)− δ) = m (M∗e , 0) ;
and if Λ > ΛII ,
λ
(
Λ,
1
2
(1− δ)
)
= m (M∗e , δ/2) .
Given the two equations above, we know that as θ increases, M∗e does not change (since λ and m
are independent of θ). This implies that c (M∗e , θ) increases with θ, and V decreases as a result.
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For interstate competition, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium (b = 1/2) and on regime l
(since the case of regime r is identical by symmetry). Recall that in the second stage, the FOC
is given by:
∂Vl
∂Ml
=
−m1 (Ml, b−Gl)
2m2 (Ml, b−Gl) y −
∂c
∂Ml
= 0.
Differentiating the condition with respect to θ gives us:
dMl
dθ
=
c12
∂2Vl
∂M2l
< 0,
since ∂
2Vl
∂M2l
< 0 and c12 > 0. Since b is a function of Gl, Gr, Ml, and Mr,
dVl
dθ
=
∂b
∂Gl
∂Gl
∂θ
y +
∂b
∂Gr
∂Gr
∂θ
y +
∂b
∂Ml
(
∂Ml
∂Gl
∂Gl
∂θ
+
∂Ml
∂Gr
∂Gr
∂θ
)
y
+
∂b
∂Mr
(
∂Mr
∂Gl
∂Gl
∂θ
+
∂Mr
∂Gr
∂Gr
∂θ
)
y − ∂c
∂Ml
(
∂Ml
∂Gl
∂Gl
∂θ
+
∂Ml
∂Gr
∂Gr
∂θ
+
∂Ml
∂θ
)
=
((
∂b
∂Gl
+
∂b
∂Ml
∂Ml
∂Gl
+
∂b
∂Mr
∂Mr
∂Gl
)
y − ∂c
∂Ml
∂Ml
∂Gl
)
∂Gl
∂β
+
((
∂b
∂Gr
+
∂b
∂Ml
∂Ml
∂Gr
+
∂b
∂Mr
∂Mr
∂Gr
)
y − ∂c
∂Ml
∂Ml
∂Gr
)
∂Gl
∂β
− ∂c
∂Ml
∂Ml
∂β
.
Since ∂M
∗
r
∂Gr
= −∂M∗l
∂Gr
, the first two terms in last expression are zero (From Lemma 1). This
implies that:
dVl
dβ
= − ∂c
∂Ml
∂Ml
∂β
≥ 0.
A.7 Tax Reimbursement
Claim. If θ is sufficiently high, the empire provides a strictly positive tax reimbursement (Re > 0).
Proof. Consider the case of an empire facing a one-sided threat (for our purpose, it suffices to
show that the claim is true for a one-sided threat. The proof for a two-sided threat is similar).
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The optimization problem is given by:
max
Ge,Me,Re
y − c (Me)−Re
s.t. Re ≥ 0;
m (Me, Ge − (1− δ)) +Re = λ (Λ, 1− δ) ;
m (Me, |x−Ge|) ≥ λ (Λ, x) for some x ∈ [0, x∗ (Λ)] .
Let x∗ = arg maxx m(Me, |x−Ge|) − λ (Λ, x). Since λ2 < 0, x∗ ≥ Ge (otherwise, the empire
can increase its net tax revenue by increasing Ge and decreasing Me or Re).
If R∗e = 0, then Ge = 1 − δ since m2 < 0. If G∗e > 1 − δ, it must be the case that R∗e > 0
(otherwise, if R∗e = 0, the empire can increase its net tax revenue by decreasing Ge and Me
simultaneously). Therefore, it suffices to compare R∗e = 0 and R∗e > 0 when Ge = 1− δ.
When Ge = 1− δ, the Lagrangian optimization problem is:
max
Me,Re
y − c (Me)−Re + φRe + γ (m (Me, 0) +Re − λ (Λ, 1− δ))
where φ and γ are the Lagrangian multipliers. The first order conditions are given by:
Me : − cM + γm1 (Me, 0) = 0,
Re : − 1 + φ+ γ = 0,
φ : φRe ≥ 0 and either φ = 0 or Re = 0,
γ : λ (Λ, 1− δ) = m (Me, 0) +Re.
If R∗e = 0,
cM (M
∗
e ) = (1− φ∗)m1 (M∗e , 0) , and
λ (Λ, 1− δ) = m (M∗e , 0) .
Since M∗e depends on Λ and δ but is independent of θ, dM∗e /dθ = 0.
If R∗∗e > 0, φ∗∗ = 0, and
cM (M
∗∗
e ) = m1 (M
∗∗
e , 0) , and
λ (Λ, 1− δ) = m (M∗∗e , 0) +R∗∗e .
The above conditions imply that dM
∗∗
e
dθ
= − c12
(c11−m11) < 0 since c12 > 0, c11 > 0, and m11 ≤ 0.
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Furthermore, note that:
m (M∗e , 0) = m (M
∗∗
e , 0) +R
∗∗
e
> m (M∗∗e , 0) .
Since m1 > 0, M∗∗e < M∗e . Now, let
Ψ ≡ c (M∗e )− c (M∗∗e )−R∗∗e
= c (M∗e )− c (M∗∗e )− λ (Λ, 1− δ) +m (M∗∗e , 0) .
The empire should set Re > 0 only if Ψ > 0. Now,
dΨ
dθ
=
∂c (M∗e )
∂θ
− ∂c (M
∗∗
e )
∂M∗∗e
dM∗∗e
dθ
− ∂c (M
∗∗
e )
∂θ
+
∂m (M∗∗e , 0)
∂M∗∗e
dM∗∗e
dθ
=
∂ (c (M∗e )− c (M∗∗e ))
∂θ
− ∂ (c (M
∗∗
e )−m (M∗∗e , 0))
∂M∗∗e
dM∗∗e
dθ
=
∂ (c (M∗e )− c (M∗∗e ))
∂θ
− ∂ (c (M
∗∗
e )− λ (Λ, 1− δ) +R∗∗e )
∂M∗∗e
dM∗∗e
dθ
=
∂ (c (M∗e )− c (M∗∗e ))
∂θ
− ∂ (c (M
∗∗
e ) +R
∗∗
e )
∂M∗∗e
dM∗∗e
dθ
.
If θ is sufficiently large, the first term above is positive because cMθ > 0 and M∗e > M∗∗e , the
second term is positive because ∂(c(M
∗∗
e )+R
∗∗
e )
∂M∗∗e
> 0 and dM
∗∗
e
dθ
< 0, and dΨ
dθ
> 0 as desired.
A.8 A Numerical Example
We illustrate Corollary 7 using a simple numerical example.
Suppose λ(Λ, t), m(Mi, t), c(Mi, θ), and u(c, n) have the following functional forms: λ(Λ, t) =
Λ − αt, m(Mi, t) = Mi − βt2, c(Mi, θ) = θM2i , and u(c, n) = c1−γnγ. Let: Λ = 20, α = 35,
β = 100, δ = 0.45, y = 1500, and θ = 1. To show NF > NE, it suffices to demonstrate
Area 〈E〉+Re < Area 〈F 〉.
For continent E, the capital city is located at 1 − δ = 0.55, military investment is M =
1/ (2θ) = 0.5, and the tax rebate is Re = − 12θ + (ΛE − α (1− δ)) = 0.25. Subsequently,
Area 〈E〉+Re = −5.4327.
For continent F , the location of two capital cities are given by Gl = Gr = 12 − 12
(
y
4θβ2
)1/3
=
0.33264. Each regimes invests M = y
2/3
42/3β1/3θ2/3
= 11.204. Subsequently, Area 〈F 〉 = 4.6374.
Since Area 〈E〉 + Re − Area 〈F 〉 = −5.4327 + 4.6374 = −0.7953 < 0, in this case the
population falls more sharply under political centralization than under political fragmentation
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when the shock is realized.
A.9 Population Fluctuations
Pop. (’000) t t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 N Adj. R2
China 69.4*** - - - - - 14 0.58
Europe 54.2*** - - - - - 14 0.67
China -77.8 0.081*** - - - - 14 0.78
Europe -68.8*** 0.068*** - - - - 14 0.94
China 44.2 -0.092 6.4 · 10−5 - - - 14 0.79
Europe -0.62 -0.029 3.6 · 10−5* - - - 14 0.95
China -144.9 0.44 −4.1 · 10−4 1.3 · 10−7 - - 14 0.80
Europe -12.0 0.026 7.1 · 10−6 8.1 · 10−9 - - 14 0.95
China 300.5 -1.61 0.0027 −1.9 · 10−6* 4.6 · 10−10* - 14 0.86
Europe 144.7 -0.72 0.0011 −7.1 · 10−7 1.6 · 10−10* - 14 0.96
China 242.3 -1.21 0.0018 −8.9 · 10−7 −5.0 · 10−11 9.6 · 10−14 14 0.84
Europe 34.4 0.036 −6.7 · 10−4 1.2 · 10−6 −8.1 · 10−10 1.8 · 10−13 14 0.96
Constant terms are not reported. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 8: Fitting Year Polynomials to Chinese and European Population Data. Adjusted
R2 is higher for Europe than for China in each case.
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